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This dissertation has been written in l iau of two optional papers 
(3rd and 4th) of M.A,Iblitical Science Examination 1968, Aligarh Muslin 
TJhiversity, Aligarh. 
The subject of this study is " India and the problem of Palestine 
I have made an attempt to trace the history of Palestine in the context of the 
manouwers made by the ^rst.-4/hile mandatory Powers to keep its strangle-'hold 
on one of the most sensitive and strategic region of the world. After the 
debacle of the Ottoman Empire the Arab world became a victim of imperialistic 
manipuLations \iiich reached their cliaax when a continous and persistent 
ef fort was made to carve out a national home for Jews in the Arab teirritory* 
I have analysed the various stages of this developient from the creation 
of Israel, the long cherished homeland of the Jews, to the various expedients 
applied to expand the area of ooctpation with the clandestine stpport and 
open collaboration of the wester Powers, mainly , Great Britain and the U.S.A. 
I have cr i t ical ly examined the attituie of India at various stages of 
this development. I have tried to bring out the background and reasons for the 
consistent support which India rendered at various planes. I have tried to 
show that in rendering this sigsport India was guided by the highest principles 
of Justice and fMr-play and also its objective of helping in the maintenance 
of world peace. Apart from these reasons, the Indian peoples have centuries 
old cultural and economic ties with this region which hayTjeon examined in 
detail. 
The establishment of Israel in Rilestine constitutes a period of great 
significance in the history of the Arab world. I t led to recurrent conflicts and 
dlssenUions between the Arab riorld and the Sv^jer-Powers. The struggle of Jevis 
to have a separate homeland was challenged by the Arabs at every stage. The 
big powers played their heinoijs role in this region and made it a trouble -
' spot. I t has attracted the attention of a l l powers, big or small, capitalistic 
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or socialxstic, aligned or non-aligned for varying economic and pol i t ical 
reasons. I have stvidied a l l the aspects of the problem in detail . 
I have made cr i t ica l and extensive use of the literature available on 
the subject as much as the limited tine at my disposal permitted. 1 detailed 
bibliography of the -works on v^iich this study is based is givai.at the end. 
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XNIBSpUCHON 
THB PALESTINIAN laSUB IN WORLD POLITICS 
The term Middle-i^ast lias been variously defined. Often i t has been leed 
interchangably with the term Near East. In fact, these designations are 
reminiscent of the days when western Europe, especially great Britain, doraiaated 
the world scene. Such expressions as Far East, Middle East and Near East were, 
naturally, in reference to v^stem Europe. Today, f o r instance, a greater 
portion of what is generally covered by the term Middle East is being 
described more and more in Asian countries as Wsst Asia, 
However, for reasons of convenience, the t em Middle East wil l be used 
in this work—not, indeed, as a matter of geography, bub rather in the sense 
of i ts pol i t ica l and cultttral mi ty . I t wi l l Include besides the Middle East 
heartland, Tttpkey in the North, Iran in the East, Egypt and the Stflan in the 
west and the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf protectorates in the south. I t 
w i l l further include the MTislim northern fringe of Africa, that is Lybia, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco extending west-i^ards, and Afghanistan as 
well as Pakistan east words. The reason why these countries are included is 
that they have become, in one way or another, involved with scane of the 
questions that together constitute liiat has cone to be known as the Middle 
East Problem, 
In the words of S,N,Fisher," in the mid - twentieth century the term 
Middle East refers to that area of the world comprising the present pol i t ical 
states of Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,Behrayn, 
Qatar, Trucial, Oman and Muscat, Oman, Aden and Aden Brotectorate, Yemen, 
Egypt, Suian, Turkey and Iran, In addition Middle East is employed as a 
cultural designation for a society and civi l izat ion found noft oaily in that 
A/ 
region but also to a certain degree in a maaber of adjicent local i t ies stch 
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as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lybia, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. 
Two geographic features of the Middle East have been significant in 
a l l periods of history. I t s location has given i t an important, some tines 
strategic, position betijeen Africa and Eurasia, and between the Mediterra-
nean world and the Asia, of India and the Far East. Nations, tribes, 
traders, armies, and pilgrims — peoples on the move —- have traversed 
the Middle East, finding the land bridge convenient and along the way 
discovering the wealth of the area and the civi l ization of i ts people".1 
I t has been an unalterable accident of history that the nations 
occi^jying i t consists mainly of the Arabs who are by race semetic and 
by religion Muslims. I t is strategically a very important area — being 
a meeting place of three continents. Economically i t s potential and 
products constitute the essential products of the world auch as o i l , cotton, 
olive, etc.Historically i t has remained for centocies the cradle of huge 
and most powerful empires. After the Second world war \iien the esrstwhile 
Caliphate capitulated and the territory was under i ts legal domination 
parcelled oub between small principalates on the plea of self-detezmination 
and the mandated territories were established, the politics of this region 
took an entirely new turn. 
The Middle East has a l l along been seething with tension and unrest. 
Those who have passed the greater part of their l i f e in the West Asia 
have often realised that they were l iving on the edge of a volcano. I t is 
very d i f f i cu l t to know when i t would ertpt next. Thiexpected changes of 
Governmsnt have been going on overnight. At the f i r s t glance i t a l l seemed 
inexplicable and maccountable, bufc on closer analysis there have been 
1. Fisher S.N. - The Middle East - A History 
P.3. 
London - R & K Paul Ltd. 
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discovered certain mder-currents whose presence, actions and inteiv 
actions 'explained/ to a large exfceni, the factors which were responsible 
fo r such abrv?)t changes; however superficial they happened to lae, Btib 
s 
there is fitifificient evidence to show that these changes ref lect certain 
specific and defimble patterns. Scholars of west Asian studies often 
t e l l us this region have always been faced with some thought-engaging 
changes that have been coming i?) in this area partly having indigenous 
origins and partly thriist directly or manipulated iunpeiBeptibly by 
imperialist forces. The people of these regions, who were under going 
a period of decadence and stagnation were stirred by nei/ idea mostly 
borrowed from modem western socities. The old concepb of a static 
Islamic society was yielding place to social ist ic, democratic and 
secular ideals. Gradually these seeds geimiaated and struck their roots 
deeper and also sproufced inwards. Informed writers agree on the point 
that " these trends have created a sort of soul-siclmess amongst the 
intellectuals and the masses..... they are however unable to diagnose 
their a f f l i c t i ca i " . ! . The teething troubles of a newlv emerging polit ics l y 
and the birth pangs of a ne\/social order were in eveidence every where. 
There was a conflict of the old order with the new concepts. And conse-
quently each department of thought and l i f e was infiluenc«i by them. 
The traditional pseudo- Islamic system of pol it ics, law, society and 
economics vias faced with a new chal3.enge at each level , "The western 
concept of nationalism, self-deteimination, demoncracy and progress 
receieved whole hearted response from the inhabitant® of the Middle Sas fS , 
Im Gibb - Modem Trends in Islam. Chicago, 1947. 
2. Morrison a.A. - Middle Mst Tensions : Political,Social and Religious. 
P. 9. 
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These new forces influenced the religious thought, the ciiLtural 
traditions and the social oublook. The most remarkable thing was the 
creation of a sense of national self-deteimination which was responsible 
for the emergence of the idea of Arab Nationalism and struggle for home-
land. " The increased momentum of western Influences threatened to reduce 
drastically a l l the national oriental elements in Middle Eastern cuLture».l» 
The tragic story of these two nationalisms f i l l s the pages of the contemporary 
west Asian history. The self interest of both, Arabs and the Jeijs have made 
their struggle f o r self-determination an insolubly complex problem froughb 
with recurring explosive situations. The machination of big powers and the 
inherent contradictions i i the Aiab society have made the confusion worse 
confined* ^i^is region has consequently became the trouble spot of the world 
and has attaracted the attention of a l l the powers big or small, capitalistic 
or social ist ic, aligned and non-aligned for reasons varying from time to 
time. BeligioiB faiths and aspirations have always played an active part 
in determining the course of history in the ai «a. This region is rightly 
st?)posed to be the cradle of three monotheistic faiths. Nevertheless i t 
jremains the focal point of the Islamic world. For the Christian world 
also i t enshrines precious memories and monuments and for the Jews i t is 
the only object of i t s aspirations. 
Even to a casual observer Middle East (west Asia) presents a mosaic 
of pol i t ical and socio-economic system and a picture of inrest and tension. 
Every aspect of l i f e in this region is surcharged with the emobions— 
historical, racial and sdcio-political. I t is some times very disheartening 
and confusing even to the most bril l iant minds of the time. But the undeav 
standiJig of these problems and to taclcle them is of v i ta l importance. 
1. Cooke H.V. - Challenge and Respcaise in Middle East t The Quest f o r 
Prospetity. P 35. 1919 - 1951. 
- 5 -
I t is so, not only for the stabil ity, progress and prosperity of the 
area biA also for the world peace. In the modem polit ical circle i t is 
also believed that every problem concerning the west Asia has its 
international facet and every event in this region is liable to world 
repercussions. Military ejqwrbs have also predicted that the region 
may witness the next round in the struggle between the American and the 
Soviet interests. " Earl iwavell once declared that the Middle East may 
be the battle gromd both of thd material struggle for o i l and air-bases, 
and of the sp|;ittal struggle of atleast three great creeds - Christianity, 
Islam, and CcBomunism - and of the pol i t ical theories of democracy and 
torfcalitarianism".l. 
To have a fu l l comprehension of i ts problems and their importance, 
i t is necessary to have retrospective view of the development, atleast 
as fo r back as the Ottoman Empire and i ts entry into the f i r s t world 
war on the side of the central powers in I 9 l i . This historic eventmartod 
the turning point in the history of this region, Throaghoxtt the 19th 
century the westem Powers tried to shatter and crush the Ottoman Empire. 
Bufc they could never succed because of their inner and mutual discords. 
The^coiild not realise their much cherished dream of the collapse of 
this already tottering and decaying empire. The real position of the 
year 1914 has been described by George Ant onions in his, book, "The 
Arab Awakening". He writes:- ' In two score years that had elapsed 
between Abdul Hamid*s succession and the Year of 1914, the aultan had 
had to surrender several rich provinces in Asia Minor to Riassia, Cyprus 
and iSgypt to Great Britain, Tunisia to France, Lybia to I ta l y and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria now that Turkey was in the 
war a host of pentvp desires began to snif f their way towards g ra t i f i -
cation. Russia wanted constantionple and the Straits, Fiance claimed 
1. Morrison S.A. - Middle East Tensions: Political,Social & Religious.' 
P. 10. 
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Syria, Qpeat Britain was beginning to f ee l the need of an overland roitfce 
to the East, and to whatever also might be necessary to neutralise 
France's and Russia's gains, I t lay had designs on Asia Minor, and the 
Government of India turned hungry eyes towards I raq" ! , 
with this end in view, the al l ied Powea?s reached'^ secret aggreement 
in 1916 liiich is laiown as Sykes-Picot Agreement", The Agreement was about 
the f ina l disposition of Ottoaan territory after the war. According to 
the teims and conditions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement Russia was st?posed 
to have Constantinople, a strip of terr itory on each side of the Bosphorus 
and the greater part of the fovnr Turkish provinces near her frontiers, 
Britain was to have Basra and Baghdad. French jsone was j to be recognized 
V 
in Syria and Ci l ic ia. An Arab State sqmatype o^ a federation was also 
to be established and divided into Britain and French spheres of 
influence. Idlestine having special religious significance was to remain 
under a special regime to be detemined later by agreement between Rtesia, 
France and Britain, Greece was also axjarded, for her cooperation, seme 
concessions on the coast of the Asia Mindr, 
After the conclusion of the M&r in 1918 Great Britain e2qpressed 
her desire for the modification of the aykee-Picot Agreement. But France 
did not agree to this change. Meanwhile a new conception of international 
obligations towards the conquered te i r i tory developed in the minds of u 
the Allie^fetatesmen. ThjSs President wilson of U.S,A, pt± forward the 
view that "no annesgition would take place against the wishes of the people 
concerned". The principle of self-determination was to be applied whereever 
1, Antonious George t The Arab Awakening-— The Story of the Arab National 
Movement, Philadelphia, 1939. 
P. 471. 
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possible and consequently the system of mandate -was evolved. Art ic le 22 
of the Covenant of the Leagie of Nations said, " To lerritcries viiich 
are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modem world, there eho-old be applied the 
principle that the well-being and development of such people form a 
sacred t r i s t of civi l ization 
The power polit ics continued m\Kh af ter the First world war and did 
not come to an end. In the year 1919 the (Sreek troops landed at Smyrna 
under the military might of British, French and American f leets .According 
to the treaty of Sevres I ta ly and France were given spheres of influence 
in Asia Minor. So far as the allocation of the . mandates and the 
determination of the boundaries vrere concerned, the Sykes-Piccfb Agreement 
•was followed. Bub the steady growth of the sentiment of Arab nationalism 
led to the determination of the mandatoiy regime in the West Asia,althoggh 
the area s t i l l remains a centre of conflict between the r ival interests 
of the Great Powers. France had to leave Syria and Lebanon. A bone of 
contention arose between France and Spain over the deposition of the 
Stiltan of Morocco, In 1953 Russia being afraid of the vulnerability of 
her o i l fields,ptcpsued her traditicmal policy of expansionsim» In 1940 
Ribbertrop was informed that the areas north of the Itersian Gulf was the 
centre of Russia terr i tor ia l aspirations. TOTfeey f^ram time to time was 
being pressurized by RussiajA to return the provinces which Russia gave 
her at the end of the First Wbrld war. She also wislted to have certain 
modifications in the Montreux conventions of 1936. 
Russia gave the suggestion that the straits should be ptib mder the 
direct control of the Black Sea Powers and their defence made the Joint 
1« Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22» 
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responsibility of Rtssia and Ttirkey. Simply to infltjence the course of 
events ±Q Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, Russia strengthened cuLturally 
aubonamoiB re-publics. 
Great Britain had been trying to maintain her position In the 
West Asia by controling Cyprus and Aden and by her treaties with Egypt, 
Jordan and Iraq, It can be attributed to the fact that she wanted to 
continue to keep open her trade roiifces to the Far East, Britain also 
wished to have f i rent ly relaticais with the Arab States, Simply because 
their cooperation in war would be assured* The importance of the Arab 
friendship for West Asian defence was stressed in the British While 
Ifeper of 1947, But the Arabs did not develope a freindly feeling 
toviards Britain because they did ncrt l ike the British policy of 
imperialism and colonization. They were now wedded to the idea of 
trying to make their Governments pol i t ical ly stable and economically 
progressive, with the passage of time, the importance of the west 
Asian Countries have been increasing rather them deminishing. This 
area does not simply provide a land link between Europe, Asia and 
i t 
Africa, but/is also the point of intersection of many of the international 
airl ines. Moreover, the centre of gravity of world 2)il production has 
now shifted from America to the region traditionally know as Middle 
East, In the eventTof war the control of the centre of o i l would be 
indispensable to the belligerents. 
Though the West Asia is supposed to be the most important region, 
as regards international politics, yet i t is often considered to be the 
weak spot in the defensive armour of the NAD Powers against the possible 
Russian agression. To make i t more xjseful in the times of war h i ^ 
priority is given to the air bases established in North Africa, Iraq, 
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Jordan and Saudi Ai«bia. Again^to make West defence more effective and 
powerful the U.£).A. is willing to four millions of dollars into Greece, 
Turksy and Iran. Britain has also been making generous centribitbions for 
the maintenance of the Arab Legicaa. 
So that she may not be attaclfed by Russia, Turkey has aligned 
herself with the western Powers,. Infact, Turkey has strengthened her 
position by making a series of treaties with neighbouring States like 
Greece, Afghanistan, Ii^n and I i « q . 
Prior to the First world Wr &i«.bs had been subjected to Turkish 
dominaticai. During the I9fch Century a movement for Arab renaissence took 
place* The movement, stimulated by the democratic sprit of American 
education, was initiated in Beirirt and later on spread to ofcher parts 
of Arab world. I t began as a cultural movement and very soon acquired a 
pol i t ical tinge, Infact, i t was a protest against Turkish mis-rule and 
commit ion. However, i t was a nationalist movement. The aim of this 
movement was t o get rid of the Turkish yoke. Many secret and open 
societies ^^ ere fouaed by the Arabs. These societies sponsored the aims 
of the movement and had their branches in Syria, Iraq and Egypt. But 
the movement was not fu l l y coordinated because the CcBomittee of Uinon 
and Progress proved to be unsympathetic towards the Arab claims. 
Turkey entered into the First world war and the irabs, thus got 
a good chance to intensify the movement. Turfesy's hold over the Arab 
countries was precarious. I t was, therefore, from this region that the 
Arab revolt begam through the family of the Sharif Htjsain of the Hejaz. 
The Arabs of Syria and Iraq tried to take part in the revolt but they 
Tjere s t r ic t ly controlled by the Turkish forces. And at a later stage, 
when the revolt progressed, these Arabs gave their whole hearted st5)porfc< 
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Meanwhile the Al l ied Powers began to encoiirage the Arabs. They sought 
assurance from the A l l i es that the reward f o r the risks they vera taking 
would be Independence, "The El-Fatat, an important secret society expressed 
i t s intention to support Turkey in case the European countries tried to 
penetrate into Arab countries. "1 
In I9l5 correspondence started between McMahon and Sharif Husain. 
The correspondence led the -Irabs to believe that^would be recognised by^e^ 
the British Government within the terr i tor ies in which Great Britain 
.is free t o act without detriment to the interests for her ally,France, 
and according t o the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sharif of 
Mecca, Britain»s special interests in Basla and Baghdad were recognised* 
When the Sharif Husain came to know of the Balfour Declaraticai of I9l7, 
he contracted Ctommander Hogarth -vAio assured him that the •^ Ekjonomicf! 
and Po l i t i ca l freedom of the Arab population in I&lestine xjouLd be sa fe -
guarded". A declaration was also iie.de by the British Government in 1918 
to seven Arab leaders. The declaration premised freedom to the Arabs 
of Arabia and of Arab terr i tory, generally. Again, in November 1918 
a Joint Anglo-French Military Declaration stated that i t was the aim 
of the two Powers to establish in Syria and Iraq national Government, 
The Govomment would derive their authority, from the in i t iat ive and f ree 
choice of the indeginous popiiLation, 
The doubts of the Arabs liiich they had during the War had been 
raaoved by President Wilson's assitrances that the post-War settlement was 
to be based t?>an " the f ree acceptance of that settlement by the people 
immediately concerned, and not a?)on the basis of the material interests 
1. Marrison S.A. - The Middle East Tensions: Pol i t ica l , Social and 
jReligions, 
P. 18, 
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or advantage of any other nation or people vdiich may desire in different 
settlement f o r the sake of i t s own exterior influence or mastery"!* One 
of the fomrfceen points stated that " Turkish portions of the present 
Ottoman Eiapire should be assured a secure sovereignty, bitt the other 
nationalists, which are now under Turkish rule sho\jld be assured 
undoubted security of l i f e and an absoliitely Tinmolested opportunity 
of autonomous development"2• 
The Arabs xjere very much disillusioned when af ter the war the 
prorais© ijas not kept and they were denied f u l l independence* Instead 
they were placed under the mandatory regime. They realized that a 
def ini te pledge made to them had been broken. The principles f o r 
which the a l l i e s were supposed to have fought the war had beoa violated* 
To make their claims strong the Arabs referred to Article 22 of the 
League of Nations which said, " certain corammities, formally belonging 
to Turkish Empire, have reached a stage of development where their 
existance as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, 
subject to the rendeming of the administrative advice and assistance 
by a mandatory unit such times as they are able t o stand a l o n e A n 
Arab Congress held in Syria claimed that « the Arab inhabitants of 
Syria are 4o less f i t t ed or gi f ted then were certain other nations 
were granted independence", and i t was noted that the only Arab 
comtries whose complete independence vjas recognized by the A l l i es 
were the less progressive states of Arabia* But the same Art ic le of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations also stated that the wishes of 
1. Harrison S.A.- The Middle East Tension: Po l i t ica l , Social and Religious, 
P.17 & 18, 
2. Wilson's Fourteen Points. Carr E,H, International Relations between 
the Two world Wars(1919-1959) London,1955. Page 283. 
3« Covenant of the League of Nations Art ic le 22. 
- 12 -
these corammities must be princjiple consideration in the selection 
of the mandatory. In fact the wishes of these countries were overruled 
by the interests of the Bratdin. Moreover the Arabs v/ere ncrb united 
and they themselves resented the violation of the principle of their 
unity. They saw their land divided into a nmber of fragtaentary 
po l i t i ca l units. 
There were many discrepancies between the variotis undertakings 
given by Great Britain. The departments responsible fo r the Middle East 
made certain statements \Aiich created conftBion. I t was due to the 
careless drafting of some docments, especially the McMohon correspon-
dence* Britain claimed that i t was not possible for her to establish 
a single Arab state in 1919, For this the British Government gave 
many absured excuses. The necessary elements f o r the establishment of 
Ai«b state were so diverse and unrelated that nothing could be done 
f o r the independence of the Arabs, Al l ied said. Moreover they 
completely lacked in administrative experience. I t was considered to 
be in the best interest of the .Irab masses that their cotmtries should 
be under British or French mandates. Arab confidence in the integrity 
of the policy of Great Britain has never fu l l y recovered fi-can the 
shock of the Post war settlement. 
The po l i t i ca l wisdom of that sttlement is open to question. The 
king - Grave Gammission sent by President Wilson in 1919 to study the 
s i tmt ion on the spot, gave as i t s opinion that, "The terr i tory 
concerned is too limited, the population too small, and the economic, 
geographic, racial and langmge unity too manifest, to aake the setting 
tp of independent States within i t » boundries desirable, i f such 
division can possibly be avoided. The comtry is very largely Arab in 
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langmge, cuLture, traditions and customs 
Passive resistance, strickes and revolts, marked the history of 
ayria, the Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt from the year 1920 onijards. The Arabs 
might not have any objection so f a r as they technical aid and advice of 
the Oreat Britain was concerned, bid; resented the sense of inferiority 
which the mandatory system implied. Instead of achieving the right to 
self-deteimination, they considered the division of their teritoiy by 
the league of Nations as Ultra Vires. Above a l l they resented the 
sectarian divisiveness of Erench policy in Syria and Lebanon idiich 
stemmed from French opposition to the Arab nationalist moveanent because 
of fear of i ts possible repercussions of the French position in North 
Afr ica. 
One aim has dominated Arab policy since 1920 ——~ the securing 
of independence as speedily as possible. The intensity of Arab nationalism 
was forced tpon the consciousness of the British authorities. The Arab 
became more and more hostile towards the British Government and the latter 
began to fac i l i ta te the process of self-government, Egypt, whose nationalism 
marched parallel with that of other Arab states, was recognized as an 
Independent State in 1922. But complete independence was achieved fourteen 
years later . Iraq's sovereign independence was acknowledged by a series of 
treaties, and in 1932 she was admitted to membership of the Leage of 
Nations. In the same way the independent statie of Transjourdan vias 
progressively recognized in a series of treaties and agreements from 1922 
to 1946, The independence of Syria and Lebanan was declared in 1941, 
thou^ technically the mandate did not terminate until the entries of these 
countries into the liiited Nations in 1945. 
Marrison S.A» - Middle East Tensions: Pol it ical , Social and Religious 
I^ge 19. 
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The protocol of Alex3.ndria Conference of Arab States in 1914 claimed 
the independence of Palestine in these words: " Palestine Interaational 
existence and independence cannot, de jure, he questioned amy more than 
can the independence of any Arab comtry". The unity of whole Arab world 
is voiced in a another sentence of the same doctonent. " The Ccramittee 
thinks that Balestiae constitutes an jmportant element in the structure 
of Arab nations, and that the rights of Arabs cannot be touched without 
the peace and stabi l i ty of the Arab world being affected. In the debates 
at the ^feited Nations the Arab States tagged the independence of Lybia, and 
the authonomy of ICnnisia and Morocco, Egypt, likewise, demanded the 
independence of Stdan from British Control, thou^ insisting on the closest 
possible link between herself and Sudan. 
The post-war settlement, for another reason, is open to criticism. 
Apait from Arab nationalism, other nationalisms also met with frustration. 
Three other groigjs who ST5)ported the Allied cause hoped for autonomy or 
independence. But the hopes of the three were doomed to dis-appointments. 
They v&re the Kurds, the Assyrians and the Arminians. The possibil ity of 
a Kurdish state was envisaged in the Treaty or Sevres of 1920, liiich 
provided for local autonomy for the Kurds. But the treaty was, however, 
replaced by the Treaty of lansanne of 1925. The treaty said nothing about 
Kuralish independence or authonomy. The Kurdish nationalism couLd not 
maii^ e to achieve i ts goal simply because of the fact that Kurdish tribalism 
was stronger than the sense of national unity. 
On the other hand we find that whatever the Great Britain or the 
itestem Powers may say about the friendship for the Arabs, the lat ter 
are convinced that the policy of Great Britain and other western powers 
is actuated primarily by ' imperialistic ' motives and dominated by the 
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»colonial' spir i t . This kind of thinking has led the Arabs to form a 
neiibral attitude. The Arabs did not resent and were not against the 
settlement vjhich followed the First world War. But they opposed the 
Westell Powers dtie to the policy purstied by them on the Palestine issue» 
To grasp the significance and repercussions of the Palestine problem 
on Middle East A f f i a i rs we must now turn our attention to the subject 
of Jewish nationalism and the growth of the Zionist Movemenfc. There 
was a semblance of settlement in this s area but a fresh^s«j?et«rQ i^s 
haunting this region and i t started vis it ing frequently, 
e 
The region knovm as Palestine came into prominjmce with the 
Zionist movement, whose objective ^ was to carve out a hwe-land for 
the international Jewry in this region.For centuries the Jews, in many M/tV 
countries, have been subjected invidious discrimination, iaaprecedented 
humiliation and persecution, for reasons partly religious and partly 
economic and pol i t ica l . The same sentiments in the 19th centiay marked 
the dawn of the Arab renaissance in the West Asia and gave rise also to 
a movement 
fo r a Jewish renaissance in Europe, The aim of this movement 
was not merel^o get rid of the physical limilations of ghetto l i f e and 
a socio-economic discrimination but also freedom from psjichological 
restrictions. The movement took place for the emancipation and enlight-
ment of the Jews. These impulses can be traced back to the French 
Rsvolation. Again, the movement created amongst the Jews fresh hopes of 
honorable assimilation into the country of their residence. Many Jews 
identified themselves with the culture and of the western countries l ike 
France and CSermany and several of them also joined the Christian Church. 
But a large nmber of persecuted Je-us thought that in certain circtmstances 
the only way -which can bring them emancipation and remove their disabi l i t ies was through large scale emigration from such countries. 
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And i t was between the years 1880 and 1914 that aboTib three million Jews 
f l ed from Eastern Eiirope to the ir,S#A« 
The Jews were also inspired by the recfudescencs of their fa i th in 
the "divine promise of an eternal ret\3m to Palestine" associated with 
the coming of the Messiah vfcich was to usher in an era of tnivejTsal peace, 
and the acceptance of one god by a l l mankind* The ifews now started 
thinking of a comtry ofl their own - their homeland - where they cotild 
develope their cuLtupe and purst© their religioxis practices uiinhibeted 
by any a r t i f i c i a l limitations or fear of persecirbion. The Jews planned 
to have their promised land throijgh po l i t i ca l devices* But many of the 
puritanical Jews opposed this idea becatise of their altra religioijs 
scruples. However, hundreds of the frightened and disgrounted Jews finding 
no other way infultrated into Palestine so that they might continue their 
studies and atleast f ind a sp i r i tm l solace of passing the last days of 
the ir l i f e there. Many others, the formers from Russia and Rumania, 
settled in jfelestine in agricultural colonies with the active sipporfc 
of y i r Moses Momtefiore and Baron Edmond de Rothchild. The nationalist 
idea continued to gain grounds, '^n 1882 an organisation called^Bilu" 
was formed in Constantinople, The purpose of this organisation was to 
establish in Bilestine an autonomous Jewish state within the Turkish, 
Empire. I t s name stook for the In i t ia ls of Hebrew meaning "Hotse of 
Jacob" come l e t us go" ! . 
Interests in the return of the Jfews to Palestine had long captured 
the imagination of christi/ins in England. Lord i^lmerston wrote to Lord 
Ponsonly in 1840; 'There exists at present among the Jexjs dispersed over 
Morrison S.A. - Middle East Tension: Pol i t ica l Social and Religious. 
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being separate and different from other people in religion and race. 
The Turkish authorities opposed the Jewish auboncany in Palestine. This 
turned the minds of early Zionists to the possibility of settlement in 
other region. The British Government suggested the El-Arish Area, between 
Egypt and I^lestine or that part of Africsa \jhich is now Kenya. Clever 
Herzl favoured the latter as a possible stepping - stone to i^lestine, 
bub the Zionist Congress of 1903 f l a t l y rejected the proposal. In the 
words of the iteel Commission of 1936 they believed that " Almighty had 
concended an indissoluble covenant between the people of Israel and the 
Holy land. The Soviet Government in 1930's devised a plan of a Jewish 
iitate in Biro-Bijan, and bfi a Jewish settlement in the Crimea, bub both 
met with scant sticcess. The Jewish immigration into Argentine was 
achieved through the enerosity of German Jewish millionaire, Baron 
Kerch. Mo other project has, however, talcen the place of Kilestine at 
any time in Jewish thought. 
Among the Zionists themselves there was a difference of opinion 
abotib the procedure to be followed for the establishment in I^lestine 
of a Jewish National Home. ISitil 1911 the main emphasis was placed, 
especially by the Jews of Eastern Exa-ope, on Pol it ical Zionion. That is, 
they wanted to secure a charter similar to the documents i^ich had 
proved so helpfsjl to the Jews in the past in saving them from persecubion. 
The Jews sought the help of the Governments of Great Britain, Turfeey, 
France and Germany in the quest fo r a charter. After the Zionist 
Congress of I 9 l l 'i^lestinain Zionisim came to the fore with the stpporb 
of the Jews of Eastern Europe. They thought that i t was only through 
organic growth, by a steady built-i?), through immigration and land 
purchase, that the hope of Jewish settlement in Palestine c ould be 
transformed into a real i ty. During the First World war the Jews prepared 
a docunent entitled 'Outline of Brogramme for the settlement of Palestine 
in accordance with the aspirations of the Zionist Movement. " The document 
began with the claim that the Jewish population of ffeilestine(T^ich in the 
programme should be taken to mean both present and future) shall be 
o f f i c i a l l y recognized by the Suzerian Government as the Jewish nation, 
and shall enjoy in that country f u l l civic, national and pol i t ical 
rights". Dr.wiezmann suggested British Government that JF^lestine should 
be recognized as the "National Home of the Jewish People"* Moreover, the 
Jews were sure that Britain would in every respect help them in establisl>-
ing a "National Home". But though the Balfour Declaration of 1917 
brought the promise of the British s^^^port for the Jewish catee, i ts 
wording f ee l ccoisiderably short of Zionist aspirations. 
The ambigxiities of the wordings of the Balfour Declaration were 
underlined in blook, as opposition from the Arab side developed. And 
latter on both Mr.Balfour and Llyd- George explained that the immediate 
establishment of a Jewish state was not contemplated. Mr.LloyBd George 
gave his interpretation saying that i f the Jews took the f u l l advantage 
of the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Home and 
became a definite majority of the inhabitants, then I^lestine would 
became a Jewish commonwealth. Jewish witnesses before the Peel Commission 
claimed that the Balfour Declaration had envisaged the "eventual creation 
of a JSwish Commonwealth in Rilestine" and Trans Jordan, and the commission 
i t se l f reached the conclusion that the words 'the establishment of a 
National Home » were the outcome of a ccmpromise between those ministers 
of the British Cabinet who contemptlated the ultimate establishment of a 
state 
Jewish/^nd those liio did not. As has been indicated earl ier before the 
birth of the Zionist Movement, the Jews were scattered throughout Europe 
and some other parts of the world. Under Islam, the Jews were in general 
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happier than in Christ dandam. Bub a complete trans of oimat ion of Jewish 
(^ aboub the middle of the 18th Centtiry. Infact, i t was the resixLt of the 
awakening of the htonanitarian ideas which led to the French Revolution, 
and the enormous increase of polulation which accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution. In this increase the Jewish population fu l l y shared. The 
spitife-ual and intellectual condition of the Jews was often deplorable, 
especially in Eastern Europe. 
There was a considerable number of Jews in Germany. During the 
19th Century the Russian Jews began to f e l l envious of the position of 
the emancipated Jews in Germany. The wanted semilar privileges fo r 
themselves as enjoyed by the German Jews. Bub Russia was comparatively 
a backward comtiy and was trying to transform herself into a modem state* 
Moreover, the number of the Jews in Russia was enormous. This the 
assimilation of the Jewish poptiLation was beyond i ts capacity. 
In Western Europe the sitoetion ijas entirely different.Itersecusion 
and expulsion had cleared the area of Jews between 11th and iSth centuries* 
They were nob in great number there. Even then they could not be 
assimilated. In 1655 Cromwell allowed the Jews to remain in England. In 
1668 the 'Governor of the East India Company proposed the naturalization 
of some Jews on account of their abi l i ty as financiers and merchants. 
It,was in 1847 that Baron de Rcrthschild was elected to the British 
House of Cammons, although the I^rliament did not allow the Jews to 
become 
a member. In the second half of the l9th centuary the Jfews were 
accored British citizemship and beftgan to take active part in British 
pol i t ica l ca as well as social l i f e . In the beginning of the 20th 
century were Jews as cabinet ministers. 
A large number of Jews in U.S.A. from a considerable part of the 
TJ.S.population. Thr process of assimilation had proceeeded very rapidly. 
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Jews have held h i ^ o f f i ce and. attained tremendotis wealth and influence. 
Conditions in America® were such that the relation betvieen Jews and 
Gentile had not become a serious problem, though there wQs a tendency 
towards, a social boycot of Jews, 
In oriental comtries, especially in Arabic speaking area, there 
was a large number of Jews. They were a part and parcel of these 
communities. In certain case», however, as in French Nodh Africa, their 
rapid assimilation to the l i f e and interests of the foreign riiLer had 
made them as object of hatred and suspicion to the native peoples. 
The Jewish influence in the Christian world read>-ed i ts climax In 
the f i r s t quarter of the 20th century. At the end of the First World V&r 
the Jewish leader tried to bring about the emancipation of the Jewish 
masses. Meanwhile, the " Jewish nationalists realized that i f the Jews 
as a -lAiole mingled with the gentiles, the entire community would, then, 
eventually lose the Jewish individx» l i ty" l « Therefore, they began to think 
of a terr i tor ia l centre for the Jews. In these circumstances i t was 
natural that the Jewish aspiration to acquire I&lestine, now 3,000 years 
old, should begin to reappear. To achieve this end a French Jews in 
1798 addressed a le t ter to his co-religionist in liiich he suggested the 
organization of J&wish coimcil. The council was sijjposed to be composed 
of a l l the branches of the Jewish population of the world. The comcil 
was to be held in Paris and sufcsjiit proposals to the Government of France 
fo r the assimilation of the Jex^ s in their country. He wrote: " The comtry 
we propose to occupy shall Include ( l iable to such arrangements as shall 
1. Wevil Nisi Dominus - A survey of the I&lestine controversy. 
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be agreeabl© to France) Low Sgypt, with the addition t i a district of 
country \ih.±ch. shall have i ts limits a line running from St .Jean d*- Acre 
to the Dead Sea, and from the South point of that lake to the Bed Sea, 
This position, which is most advantageos in the world, wi l l render us, 
by the navigation of the Bed Sea, masters of the commerce of India,Arabia 
and the South of Bast Africa 
Moses Haim Monterfisre was bom in 1784 in the hotee of a Jewish 
merchant of I t lay , In due course the uncle of this Montefiore purchased 
from him the right to practice as one of the twelve Jewish workers 
permitted at that time by the City of London, In 1824 he had been to 
Palestine where he saw that 8,000 Jews were l iving, principally in 
Jerusalem, Safad and Herrow, He met Mohd»Ali I^sha of Egypst, \Aiose 
domains ftilestine then formed part. In 1838 Sir Moses made a second 
journey to Palestine, In the diary of his voyage he wrote: " From a l l 
informations I have been able to gather the land in this neighboui>-hood 
appears to be particularly favourable for agricultural speculation. 
There are groves of olive-trees, I should think more than f i ve htindred year's 
old^ nine jOdribc yards, mtich pasture, plenty of walls j also f ig-trees, 
walnuts and infact, i t is a land that would produce almost every-thing 
in abundance, with very l i t t l e ski l l and labour, I am sure i f the plan 
I have in contemplation should succeed, i t w i l l be the means of introduc-
ing happiness and plenty into the Holy Land, In the f i r s t instance I should 
apply to Mr.Mohd.Ali for the grant of land for f i f t y yearsj some one or 
two hundred vil lages giving him an increased rent of from ten to twenty 
per cent; and paying the whole in money annually in a Allen^ndriaj but 
the land and the vi l lages to be free, during the \diole term, from every 
tax or rate, whether of ifesha or Govemaor of the severed distr icts! 
and l iver ty being accorded to dispose of the produce in any quarter of 
1, Harrison S,A, - Middle East Tension - Polit ical, Social and Religious, 
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the (2Lobe. The grant obtained, i shall please Heaven, on my return to 
En^and, from a company for the cnltiva-bion of the land and the encotjrang-
ment of otrr brothren in Exirope to return to Ifelestine. Many Jews now 
immigrate to new South wales, Canada, but in the Holy land they would 
find a greater certainty of success, here they wi l l find wells already 
dug, olives and vines already planted, and a land so rish as to require 
l i t t l e manure. By degrees I hope to induce the return of thotisands of our 
brethren to the land of Is i^e l , I am sure they woiiLd be happy in the 
enjoyment of the observance of our holy religion, in a manner which is 
impossible in Europe*l« 
The pol i t ical changes made the realisation of this project inmpossible, 
Biit Lord i^lmerston promised Sir Moses that English ComsuLs in the East 
would constitTibe themselves as far as possible the protectors of the ^ys 
in Turkish domains. Colonel Gawler, an English Off icer, took another 
ini t iat ive for Jewish colonization in i^lestine in 1845. But he could ncffc 
meot success. Hosever, in 1854, Sir Moses succeeded in providing land on 
which f i f t y - four families from Safad could take up farming. In 1870 
Alliance Israe l - l i te TJilverselle founded an agricultui^l fcichool near Jafa. 
The School was established with the intention of providing instructions in 
fanning for the sons of Jews who were l iv ing in the Ifear East-Sarl of 
Shaftesbury and Mr.Lawrence, two En^ish (Christians, took steps to assist 
the Jews of Jerusalem to acquire a further 2,500 dmamfl near Jaffa and 
to foimd the colony of Petah Tik-v^x. This they did in 1878. 
Meanwhile the Jewish students in Russia began to foim themselves 
into clubs. They intended to emigrate to i^lestine as soon as opportunity 
offered. The Bilu was formed in 1882. The wording of the appeal they 
issued is worth quotingx To our brothers and sisters in Exile, peace be 
Nevill Barbour - Nisi Dcaninous - &• survey of Idlestine controversy* 
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Jewish writers. The f i r s t among them was a German Jew, Moses Ifess. His 
socialist views made him an admirer of French civ i l izat ion. In 1862 he 
ptiblished a work in Geiman known as "Rome and Jerusalem"l. In i t he wrote: 
" what \ie have to do today for the re-establishment of Jewish national 
existence is to keep alive the hope of otir pol i t ical rebirth and to awaken 
i t ^iiere i t is doiraant. when, i f the world events which are prepairing in 
the East make possible a practical beginning of the re-establishment of a 
Jewish state, the next step wi l l be the founding of Jewish colonies in the 
ancestral land, a work in v^iich French wi l l no doubt land a hand". 
In these ideas Hess had been influenced by the writings of an 
orthodox Kabbi of the c i ty of Thorn. The ifebbi suggested that the Jewish 
millionaires, whom he described as " Jewish princes sxjch as the Jewish 
people has not been since the dispersicai should faim a Jewish ccAoniza?-
tion society. The society would have the following aims:-
"It should collect sufficient fund to purchase many desolate 
c i t ies, f ie lds, and vineyards in the Holy land, so that the desert may 
turn into Lebanaon and the hoaps of ruin into orchards, and the 
uninhabitated waste-land blossom again l ike a l i l l y and bear frxnts for 
enjoyment l ike the f i e ld which the Lord has blessed". 
Large number of Jews frcm Russia, Poland and Germany wi l l have 
to be s\pported by the society until they leam to sipporb 
themselves as agriculturists. A military disciplainted force of 
compatriots must be foimed to keep of f Beduin raids, exercise the 
functions of police, enforce lav/, and maintain order in the land» 
1. Pol i t ical Report of the ExBcubive of the Jewish agency(Jerusalem) 
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and forces the Government to stop the further influx of Je-ws." In the 
case of iijnigration into a country where the Jews were not Supreme even 
i f anti-semitism has hitherto been non-existent there, the immigrants 
w i l l carry the seeds with them in their bvndless, and the harvest will 
not be long delayed"(Herzl). 
Herzl next considered viiere he could find the necessary financial 
si5)port f o r his scheme. The Hewish millionfcres did ncjfc encourage him 
becatee they thought that to achieve a National Hcane through polit ical 
means was not desirable. So he turned from the affluent princes to the 
enthussiastic middle class and Zealons masses. Here he could achieve a 
great success. As soon as Herzl came into contact with the Jewish 
forces Tiiiich were wil l ing to cooperate with him in a national movement 
of the kind v^iich he envisaged he realized that the intensity of the 
sentiment tjhich was deteimined that the Jewish centre should be in 
Kilestine, without further delay he set about attempt to secure i^lestine 
for the Jews, Herzl then approached Sultan Abdul Hamid with the reqtiest 
that the Jews should be ceded the territory of pfeilestine for the pui^ose 
of establishing an " aristocratic republic " therein, Bttt the Turkish 
Sultan abhored the idea and was by no means prepared to entertain any 
such suggestion however siif^licatory i t might be. He, therefore, sent 
back an absotely uneqiiivocal answer on the subject of the proposed state, 
"Advice Dr,Herzl", he said, " t o take no further steps in this 
matter, I cannot alienate a single sqmre foot of land, for i t is not 
mine but my people's. My people fought for this land and f e r t i l i z ed 
i t with their b l ood , . . . , . . . . l e t the Jei/s keep their millions. I f my 
Empire i t dismembered they wi l l perhaps received Palestine gratic. But 
i t must be our corpse v^iich they cut x?), I cannot agree to vivisection"* 
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CH&ETER- I . 
THE mLFOUR DSCSLaRftTION. 
The world pigged into a colossal and devastating xjar in 1914 \iiich 
shook every nook and corner of the world* The Zionist organisation adopted 
the policy \iiich favoured the iOlied Powers. And the organisation set t?> 
i ts central bureau in Copenhagen. In Bilestine, however, Zionism became » 
more intense and began to be suspedied by the Turkish t^ovemment. Jamal 
I^sha, the Turksih Conmander, soon issued special instructions for 
combating the act iv i ty of the seditious movement \iiich is endeavouring, 
under the name of Zionism, to erect a Jewish Gkuvemment in the Palestine 
on portion of the Ottoman Empire". The ffews attempted to separate them-
selves from the rest of the inhabitants in I^lestine, Zionist were being 
deported from Russia and other parts of the world and they sought refuge 
in Palestine, 
The attitude of Jamal i^sha could 
not prevent Zionist agents 
from emphasising the merits of pro-Zionist policy ipon the Turkish and 
Geiman Governments. Jews, very cleverly did not give any opportunity to 
Turkish Cjovemment to suspect that they were disloyal. They also claimed 
that when the W r^ had been won, the Empire would have been so strengthened 
that i t would be able to profit greatly from Jewish financial assistance, 
without being in any way endangered by Jewish naticsaalism. 
To the Germans Herzl's original arguments concemiag the indentity 
of Jewish and Geman culture and business interests i^s stressed. I t 
was stated that Zioaisoi was a Jewish inteKiational movement. I t was 
mainly concerned with the Jewish interests. I t also emphasized that: "^ Et 
was a powerful movement, of great significance fo r the future, liiich, 
from a higher pol i t ical stand point, should be of the greatest interest 
to the Geiman Government". 
- 3 1 -
In Egypt Mr.Jabosinslgr, a Revisionist, from the beginning of the 
war, held the view that the All ied Powers were going to be victorious 
and that the Turkish Empire would inevitably be partitioned. He, therefore, 
said that the Jews, as Zionists, should give some definite assistance to Ore 
Qreat Britain, so that they might have a substantial cladjn i^ joai Britain 
at the end of war. I t was, moreover, essential to awaken in the En^ish 
an appetite for Bilestine. 
In England Dr.Wizman took a leading part in Zionist a f fa i rs 
Dr.lfei2man, a highly gifted and eloquent Russian Jew, exerted a great 
inflience over many British leaders and especially over Mr.Balfour* The 
attention of Mr. Balfour was drawn in the vortex of Zionism and seemed 
to have made a common cause with i t , Mr.Balfour then offered some 
ten-itory to the Zionist in East Africa, Bub Dr.Weizman refused i t saying 
that East Africa was not I^lestine, The « Manchester Guai^ iian a liberal 
nei^spaper, became an instrument of propaganda of the theory that a 
Zionist settlement in M.estine would be of great strategic and pol i t ical 
value to the British Empire. An art icle which appeared in Manchester 
Guardian on November 22,1915, from Mr,Sidebotham's pen, was apprently the 
f i r s t occasion in which, the journal "yoked the international ideal of the 
Zionist in harness with an All ied Victory in the War. " 4 quotation from 
the art icle wo\3ld serve as an example of the arguments used. He wrote; "A 
couple of thoteand years, before the Suez canal was built, the rulers of 
Egypt were perplexed with the problems of the defence of their land 
frountier, and what helped them to solve i t was the existence in the old 
Jewish nation of powerful bigge»-states against the great militi;.ry empires 
of the north^l. 
1. Nevil BarboTip - Nisi Dominous - A survey of the Palestine controversy -
Page 56, 
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The ingorance of history shown in this passage is grotesque. At the 
period mentioned there wero of coiirse, no great military empires in the 
north. So far as Egypt's northern land frontier was in g danger, i t could 
have been only from the aggressive and rather bar barons Maccabean Jewish 
kingdom i t ^ . However, Mr.Sidebotham and his Jewish friends in Manchester 
drew tp a memorandun on these lines, urging British sipport of Zionism on 
pol i t ica l and military as well as on humanitarian grounds. The memorandum 
was svihmitted to the foreign o f f i ce in 1916. They also circularised i t 
among influential people, of whom only ten repliedU>f these i t is s igni f i -
cant that Sir George Adam Smith, the gleographer of Holy Land, wrote 
condemning the idea of n&king a nation of Palestine," Palestine never had 
been, and every would be a nation", he said. The British Bilestine Ccoamittee 
T^iich consisted of Mr.Sidebotham and his colleagues, then began issuing a 
weeld-y paper. They sent this paper only to those whose assistance they 
hoped to win or whose opposition they desired to dodify. This paper has 
been characterised in the report of the Siarvey of British Gmramonwealth 
Af fa i rs as a cleverly written paper. The phrasing is that of the British 
Liberal Imperialism; the content is exclusively Zionist.1" I t was infact 
the type of paper which, by serving stipposed Jewish interest mder a cloak 
of serving the interests of the national of which the writer was a subject 
gave a plausible pretejst for the attacks of antisemites. About the same 
period Dr.lfeizmah was brought into contact with Mr.Lloyed-George, i^ose 
sympathy fo r a l l humanitairian projects made hdm a ready l istener. A 
valuable JQirish supporter in the British cabinet was the Home Secretary, 
Sir Herbert Samuel, v^en in December 1916, Mr. Balfour became Foreign 
Secretary under the Premiership of Mr .Lloyd George, Zionists hopes ran 
high. For Mr.Balfour had long sympathised with that aim, and had proably 
1. Survey of the British Commonwealth Af fa irs -
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been justi f ied in this by his v i s i t to the U.a.A. In America the Zicaiist 
iniliience was very strong and had created a veiy favourabifetittde towards 
the project dn President Wilson's mind. Negotiations then began between 
the Government and the Zionists. A formuLa was submitted by the Zionists 
organization for the consideration of the Govearament on July 18, 1917. I t 
was worfted as 
"His Majesty's Government after considering the aims of the Zionist 
organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Bilestine as the National 
Home of the Jewish people, and the right of the Jewish people to build-tp 
i ts National l i f e in Palestine under a protection be established at the 
conclusion of peace, following upon the successful conclusion of the War. 
"His Majesty's Government regards as essential for realization of this 
principle the grant of internal authonomy of ifelestine, freedon of 
immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jexd-sh National Colonizing 
corporation for the settlement and economic development of the country. 
"The conditions and forms of the internal authonomy and a charter 
f o r the Jewish National Colonizing corporation should in the view of His 
MajestJ-'s Government be eleborated in detail and determined vdth the 
representations of the Zionist organisational. 
Meanwhile, however, the Jewish Conjoint Committee, which o f f i c i a l l y 
reepresented Anglo-Jewry , sent to " The Times" a let ter strongly 
protesting against the Zionist project. "The Holy Land " they wrote, 
"has necessarily a profound and undying interest for a l l Jews, as the 
csadls of their religion, the main theatre of Bible history, and the 
site of i t s sacred memorials since the dawn of their pol i t ica l 
emancipation in Kurope the Jews have made the rehabilitation of the 
Jewish commmity in the Holy Land of their chief cares, and they have 
1. Nevil Arbour Nisi Dominess - A survey of Palestine controversy. 
PP. 57-68. 
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alijays cherished the hope that the resiilt of their labour would be the 
regeneration on I^lestine so i l of a Jewish community, worthy of the great 
memories of their environment and a course of their spiritual inspiraticai 
to the whole of Jevn:y. Accordingly, the Conjoint Goaamittee have welcomed 
with deep satisfaction the prospect of a rich fruition of this worli^  
opened to them by the victorious progress of the British Array in Bilestine'** 
The Committee went on to state that in accordance with these ideas 
i t had reconmiended that His Majesty's Government should issue a ptiblic 
declaration formally recognizing the high historic interest which 
Palestine possessed for the Jewish conmunity, and affirming that at the 
close of the war " the Jewish popuLation" in Rilestine would be secure in 
the enjoyment of Civil and religious libery, equal pol i t ical rights with 
the rest of the populaticjn, resonable fac i l i t i es for immigration and 
colonization, and such municipal privileges in the town and colonies 
inhabited by them as may be shown to be necessary. 
The'Ja t^Qaifesto of the Conjoint Committee produced a storm of protest 
in Zionist circlesj biib i ts representation sigjported by the indluence of 
Mr»Montagu, a non-zionist Jew, at that time Secretary of btate for India, 
were not without e f f ec t . For in the declaration as i t was f ina l l y sanction-
ed Palestine was not recognized as " the National Home of the Jewish 
people", bub mention was made of the establishment in idlestine of a 
national home. Provisions were also added, bub in vain, for the protection 
of the rights of the non-Jewish communities, and of the rights and 
pol i t ica l states enjoyed by the Jews in other countriss. The latter 
provision was generally understood to mean that the development of the 
National Home should not be such as to imperial the position of Jews in 
other countries, by causing them to be regarded as foreigners, and thereby 
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deprived of rights ijhich they previously possessed. 
The declaration was f ina l ly issued on November 2, 1917 in the fom 
of a le t ter addressed by Mr.Balfour to Lord Rothschild, aleading English 
Jews, in sympath with Zionist aspirations. The let ter runs as folioxjs:-
"I have much pleasure iti conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations, v^ich has been submitted to and approved by the cabinet, 
'Eis Majesty's Government view with favour the establishitenb in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and wi l l use their 
best endeavours to fac i l i ta te the achivement of this object, i t being 
clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the 
c i v i l and religious rights of existing non-Jewish commmities in I^lestine 
or the rights and pol i t ical status enjoyed by Jevre in any other country." 
I shall be grateful i f you would being this declaration to the 
knowledge of the Zionist Federation"l« 
Yours sincerely, 
Arthur James Balfour. 
Great pains were talcen to make the declaration known to the Jewish 
population of central and Eastern Europe. Millions of leaf lets were 
circulated through the Jewish Communities. They were dropped frcan the air 
on German and Austrian and widely distributed throu^ the Je;d.sh belt 
From Poland to the Black sea.2, There were many reasons which led him to 
favoured the Jews, Dr.lfeizman also an important factor in this regard. He 
became a noted research worker in Chemistry at Manchester liaiversity, and 
after the outbreak of war in 1914, contribufced notably to the British war 
e f for t with discoveries in the f i e ld of explosives. There is l i t t l e doubt 
that Dr.Veisanan's wise and eloquent advocacy of the Zionist cause, and 
1« Nevil Barbour - Nisi Dominus - A survey of I^lestine controversy. 
Page 61, 
2, Royal Commission Report (July 1937), Page 23, 
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and the respect in v/hich he was held by British Pol i t ical leajders, were 
powerful factors behind thfl issue of the Balfour Declaration. 
Mr.Llyod George, in a Parliamentary debate in June 1936, described 
the geseral situation of the Al l ies at the movement when the Declaration 
was issued/''lt was one of the darkest period of war. At the time the 
French Army had mutinied, the Italian Army was on the eve of Collapse, 
and America had hardly started prepairing in earnest. We can to the 
conclusion that i t was v i ta l that we should have the sympathies of the 
Jewish caframunity". This statement of Lloyd George was not made until 
nearly twenty years after the period concerned, and, inspite, i t is a 
l i t t l e d i f f i cu l t to see why the sympathies of the Jewish Ccmmunity 
should have been considered as particular so v i ta l to British interests 
at that moment. The U.S.A. has entered the v^r some months before. The 
Russian Revolution had removed any unwillingness of the Russian Jews 
to f ight on the side of the Al l ied. Dr. weizman himself stated that 
before the Royal Commission in 1936 that most of the rich Je-ws were not 
Zionists, and that, therefore, no question seeking Jewish fjUiancial 
assistance involved. I t is asserted that i t was mainly and primarily on 
humanitarian grounds, and not on account of material sxpport, that the 
British Government favoured the Zionist course. I f the English Pol i t ical 
leaders had such a high moral then why did they impose Jews on Arabs and 
thereby do a great injustice. They badly needed money for war e f forts 
which at that time they could get from the Jex/s only, and that is why 
to say 
they supported the idea of a National Homel. I t could also be true/that 
the British Cabinet in general were influenced by the idea that such a 
1. Laqueur w.2. The Middle East in Transition. 
Pracgar Mew-York 1958. PP.100-111. 
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declaration would in some way help the British cause, at a moment vAien no 
help couLd be neglected. In the proigagating of this be l i e f a great part 
was played by the British Kilestine Committee xjith i ts powerful Press 
connections. 
The British public had no forboding of these fiiture contraversies. 
This an enthusiastic meeting was held at the Govent garden Opera House 
on December 2,1917. The meeting was held to celebrate the issue of 
Balfour Declaration, The speeches made by the three English si:?)porters, 
on this occation of the Declaration, fu l l y confirm the thesis that the 
motive for i ts issue was predominantly humanitarian. Lord Robert ceci l 
stated that "our wish is that Arabian countries shall be for the Arabs, 
Aemenia for the Armenians and Jirdea for the J e w s a n d i t is can 
so l e t Turkey, real Turkey, be fo r the Turks". 
These machinations show that there was a great and planned 
c 
conspira/y, of which the British were the main architects. The purpose 
/V 
of this conspiracy was to drive a wedge into the Arab territory and 
then to make i t a constant source of trouble for the Arab nations® The 
purpose was twofold, f i r s t to create and carve out a national hcane for 
the Jev;s, who out of gratitude for their benefactors, would subserve 
their imperialist-cum-capitalist interest on the o i l rich resurgent 
Arab Soil and secondly to perpetuete a tension in this region so that 
they may always remain economically backward, pol i t ica l ly unstable, 
mi l i tar i ly dependent igjon the recourses constantly offered by the so 
called benefactors of the humanity. Consequently the sentiment of Arab 
nationalism was sought to the developed around this nucleus whereas the 
sentiment of nationalism at home had not fu l l y crystalised. In the word 
of Berger "Social history and personel development have combined to 
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produce a society. In the near East in which msecurity, hdistility, 
siispicioa, revilary, find their ccaapensation in strong adhencence to 
religious r i tual . , patterns of iagration and hospitiality and a limited form 
of cooperation". 
The British authorities were probably content to leave the 
phraseology of the Balfour Declaration vague, and to cmmait to the future 
the respdinsibility, •''or determining i ts presise meaning and implications. 
Bub i t may well be contended that a National Home in the fu l l sense of 
the words carry with them the logical implication of pol i t ical independfl^c®* 
A Guaranteed mdnority-Statjis for the Jews in Palestine would have meant, 
as Dr.Weizman pointed out, nothing bT>.t a ghetto l i f e in an Arab State, 
There are many consideration due to which British Government 
st?)ported the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
First ly Christian of the Great Britaish had a genuine sympathy for the 
Jews. Secondly Britain was too much desirots to secure the backing of 
world Jewry at a time when the war was not going too well. Thirdly and 
last ly the Government of Great Britain wanted to honotir Dr.weizman for 
his services to rendered during the war. Moreover, Britain's special 
interest in the Middle East also influenced her policy. Sir Leopold 
Amery drew attention to the importance of Palestine in Qreat Britain's 
imperial policy. Dr.weizman has recorded the fact that "Italian look 
on Zionism as a clock for the creation of a British Imperial oub post in 
the Levant. 
The Zionists did not want Palestine to be Internationalised as 
envisaged in Sykes-Peccrfc Agreement, they did also oppose a British-
French Condiminion. Dr.weizman was convinced that Great Britain was the 
one power to whose keeping the Jewish National Home could be safely 
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entrusted. Thus the American-Jewish congress in 1918 and the Zionist 
organization in 1919 urged the selection of Great Britain as the mondatory, 
Atleast the mandate for Palestine was allocated to Great Britain, mainly 
because of Balfour Declaration. France on this occasion expressed her 
anger and maintained that P-alestine really f e l l within her sphere of 
inflience in Syria and the Roman Catholic Communities in Palestine 
disliked a Protestant mandatory powers. 
In the text of the mandate the Balfour Declaration was also 
incorporated. The Jews hoped that the mandate would give open recogni-
tion to the historic right of the Jews to Palestine. Instead i t recogniz-
ed only the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, 
and the grounds for reconstitxrbing their %tional Home in that country. 
Article 2 reads:- " The mandatory shall be responssible for placing the 
country under such pol i t ical , administrative and economic conditions as 
wi l l secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home as laid down 
in the Preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, 
and also for safeguarding the c i v i l and religious rights of a l l the 
inhabitants of f^lestine, irrespective of race and religion. But the 
great Britain certainly did not tBe every endeavour to discharge this 
threefold responsibility. Britains, being partial, always favoured Jevrs. 
And persistent Arab opposition to the National Home eventually under-
moned the foundations of the \iiole British policy. 
The conclusion must not, however, be drawn that the Arabs lacked 
sympathy for the Jews in their f l ight in Europe. In most of the Islamic 
countries the non-Mi;Blims were not loyal to their Government. And i t was 
on this account that many Jei/s vjere expelled from Spain and Portugal in 
1492. But they were accorded welcome in Muslim Lands. The Sharif-Husain 
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in converstation with 6oiinniaiider Hogarth in 1918, expressed his willing-
ness to help the perseci&ed^ Jews. He said that he would welcome them 
in a l l Arab lands. Again, imder certain conditions the iSniir Feisal, son 
of Sharif Husain, was prepared to implement an agreement reached with 
Dr.weizman in 1919 for the settlement of Jews in Palestine. Part of the 
preamble of this docment in worth quoting as illustrating the relaticais 
between these leaders of the two cummunities. "Mindful of the racial 
kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish 
people, and relizing that the unrest means of working out the consummation 
of their national aspiration in through the closest possible collaboration 
in the develoiment of the Arab St^ t^e and Palestine .....(we) have 
agreed, etc. The conditions specified were never fu l f i l l ed and the 
agi^ement lapsed. A Syrian Committee fomed in Paris at the tijae of 
peace Conference stated that " Al l those among them(the Jews) who are 
oppressed in certain retrograde counties are welcome. Let them settle 
in Palestine, but in an autonomous I^lestine connected with Syria by the 
sole bond of d federation. 
At the J&.ris Conference of 1919 the itoir Feisal had admitted that 
I^lestine stood in a unique position. In a memorandum, presented to the 
conference he xv-rote:- " The Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility 
of holding level the scales in the cfesh of races and religouns that has 
in this one province so often involved the world in d i f f icul t ies . They 
would wish for the effective siq)er-position of a great trustee so long 
as the representative local administration commended itsel f by actively 
promoting the material prosperity of the country. But this ms not typical 
of the Arab attitute which claimed that I^lestine f e l l within the area 
reserved for the Arab in the McMahon correspondence. Bub this was o f f i c ia l l y 
denied by the British Government. The Arabs wholeheartedly opposed the 
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mandate on principle. The main, contention of the Arabs x^ as that Great 
Britain had no right to dispose of Bilestine solely because she had been 
instrumental in freeing i t from the Turks, At the 1933 Conference the 
Lord Chancellor admitted that in I9l8 Great Britain had not been free 
to dispose of Ifelestine \d.thoxit regard for the wishes and interests of 
the inhabitants. 
The assumption is therefore, justifi^ed^"the prime cause of the 
disaster were the British, i t was they who gave the Jews the Balfour 
declaration of I9l7 with i ts National Heme and then opened the door to 
them, British protection and parronage enabled the Jex^ s to ngike 
I&lestine their home and to multiply under the protection of the British 
Arms. Their colonies were founded and extended and the Jewish immigration 
flourished, tSader the wing of the British mandate Jewish terrorisim 
hatched and grew and was trained by the British hand until i t became 
an organised It l l itary force"1. 
Arab opposition to the mandate and to the Jewish National Home 
increased rather than diminished as years fo l l owd. The ^ e r a l standards 
of health were not raised by the British Government, A^^b agriculture v©s 
not allowed to flourish. Malaria and such other dangerous diseases were 
very common among the people. The land-tax was increased and the Arabs 
were being deprived of brining their lands under cul1»ivation. On the 
contrary the general standards of healths for the Jews were raised. Land 
tax was reduced for the Jews only. In the f i e ld of education the British 
Goveriment could not provide f ac i l i t i e s for the Arabs, Most of the money 
vas spent on education devoted to Jewish schools. 
1, Musa AUami ^ The lession of Palestine, Middle East Journal October 
1949 i^ges 373-74. 
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The Arabs opposed the mandate becuase they wanted f u l l independence 
and they also thought that the Jewish NationalHome would deprive them of 
the independence. I^lestinian ju-abs f e l t dissatisfied and there was a 
deep urrest among them. The Arabs were sxjspecious of the Zionist propaganda 
and British intentions. The mandate, infact, was merely a cynical device 
for promoting British "Implrealism" mder the mark of humane consideration 
of the Jev/s. 
The 3bws also did nothing to al lay Arab feai^. f&lesfcine was 
considered as a country almost without inhabitants. Some Jews believed 
that the Arabs would welcome them because of the material benefits they 
brought with them.Individual Arabs were of the considered as baclcward 
and inferior. Certain aspects of the Jewish economy excluded Ji^ rab 
partipipation. The struggle betvjeen the Jews and the Arabs was regarded 
as a contest between progress and reaction. Among the Jews i t was belived 
that : " Had they (imraigspant») shown a l i t t l e more discretion and less 
self righteousness, more adaptability and broader interpretation of their 
prioneer - mission the e f for t , even i f rejected, even i t ultimately 
hopeless, would have made a great difference, particularly for the latter 
internal development of the State of Israel" . Dr.weizman erven at one time 
expressed the hope that Palestine ij-ould ultojuately become as Jewish as 
England is English.1 
The Jews also had not fai led to realise the siprone importance of 
good relations with Arabs fo r they wanted to l ive in J^lestine. The 
Zionist Conference in 1921 passed resolution expressing ' the determination 
of the Jewish people to l i ve with the Arab people on terms of unity and 
mutual respect, and together with them to make the comniin home into a 
floiipishing community, the tp-building of which may assure to each of i ts 
peoples an vindistrubed national development'. But i t was on paper only. 
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Practically a l l t ^ Jei;s were hostile toijards the Arabs. 
I t was a common belief that the mandatory might have done more to 
promote good-will between the two parties, Biitfe inabil ity to seciire Arab 
cooperation doomed the policy of the mandate to faxLure. The Shaw Commission 
•vdiich visited Palestine in 1929, reported* " A National Home for the Jevra, 
in the sense in which i t was widely understood, was inconsistent with the 
demands of Arab nationalists, while the claims of Ai«ib nationalism, i f 
admitted, would have rendered impossible for fulfilment of the pledge to 
the Jews^l. The iteel Commission in 1936 described the disturbance in 
Palestine as ' the outcome of a conflict between Arab and Jewish national-
ism'. In the opinion of the Commission, ' i t is fundamentally a conflict 
of right with r i g h t T h i s conflict has been described as one between 
a nationalism \iiich was being satisfied mder powerful protection, and a 
nationalism in process of frustration. The complexity of the sitvetion 
was accentuated by the fact that no where in the world was nationalism 
more intense in the period between the two wars than in the Middle East, 
and no\Jiere was i t more deeply seated than in Palestine "3• 
British bureaucracy did not strive to reconcile the claims of the 
sides, because i t waft against her diplomacy and the policy of 'divide and 
rule ' . The Arabs urged that the question of the l e ^ l i t y of the mendate be 
referred to the International Court of Justice. After getting no response 
from the British Government they then began to agitage as the promises 
made for the independence v/as not ftiLfil led by the formers 
The Jbv/s on the other hand maintained that the primary purpose of the 
mandate was the establishment of the Jewsih National Ifome, and that a l l other 
1, The Shaw Commission Report. 
Z* Peel Commission Report 1936. 
3. Moriison S.A. - Middle East Tentions, Political,Social & Religious. 
P. 33. 
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objectives must be stiboi^iinated to this. To them there vjas nothing wrong 
with the mandate. To promote the establishment of the National Home they 
convined at i l l ega l immigration, f ict i t ious marriages, and the opening 
of mushroon banks. The British Gorvernment j with waarysome regularity, 
sent Commission after commission to Palestine to study the situation on 
the spot, and to make recommendations. I t tried in 1922, 1930, 1936 and 
again in 1939, so as to re-interpret the mandate and make i t worlcable. 
when in 1939 the British Government f ina l ly adopted an interpretation 
which the majority of the members of the Psrmanent Mandates Commission 
considered to be incompatible with the text of the mandate, the Jeys 
in turn had recourse to violence. So often had British policy fattered 
that by this time both sides shared the same conviction that nothing 
but the use of force coiiLd induce the British Government to change its 
mind. 
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CHAPTER I I 
THE IMDEPEMDEm' STATE OF I S i m THE INDIAN ATTITUDE. 
Palestine has throtighout the ages occT;?)ied an important place, in 
the Middle East. From the point of view of ciiLtural origins, i t has a l l 
along been one of tha most ancient centres of c iv i l izat ion. In terms of 
modem pol i t ical phenomena, i t is the seat of one of the youngest of 
nation-states. I t is the bridge across which have traversed the carvans 
of trade, the armies of war, and on i ts surface have fused and contrast-
ing culture although maintaining the distinct overtones of a particular eiA !^ 
cultxa:^. For quite substantial periods of time Palestine has foimed parts 
of the European-Mediteranean world. At other times i t has belonged to the 
emprires of Asia minor the Iranian Plateau and the valley of the Nile. 
Never has i t figured more consequentially in human fort tines, however, 
than in the countemporary period. Throughout medieval and most of modem 
times, the history of i^lestine has been chequerred with the good rule 
and bad rule of the power that happened to gain ascendancy in the land 
last of the Mediterranean. Owing to the conquest of Sultan Selim I , 
Palestine after 1516 lay within the fold of the ottoman Empire. During 
the subsequent four hundred years, while ottoman Empire, and its prestige 
gradually diminished the state of a f fa irs in Palestine were such as to 
rule out the possibil ity of developing anything even distantly resembling 
a national sentiment. 
The Palestine issue \iiich developed during the period 1945-48 had 
i ts origins in the interwar period as stated before, after the world Vfer I 
Britain was the Administering Authority for I&lestine. "The intense 
conflict between the Arabs and Jews continously disturbed the peace of 
the comtry and raised many problems "1. 
1, Karunakaran K.P. -India and World af fairs (A'ug. 1947-Jan. 1950) 
Oxford University Press. PP.248-S49. 
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4 nmber of plans were proposed for the solution of the pol i t ical 
deadlock in I^lestine. The Peel Commission, appointed by British Govemmsji 
vrent to Palestiae in 1936 to study the question. They recommended the 
partition of I&lestine into two states. This and many other plans fo r the 
solution of the deadlock, which were suggested betijeen 1945 and 1948, 
were rejected bj'- one party or the other. 
The great strategic im.portance of the East Mediterranean and the 
Middle East for the British Empire was clear to those who were in po^er 
in the Dhited Kingdom, and conseqmntly they had their 
own limitations 
in regard to their policy in ^ les t ine . British had also to take account 
of the fact that a l l the members of the Arab League had svpported the 
Palestine Arabs in their unqualified reiPrsal to admit even a single Jew 
to Palestine. In 1939 a British while I&per suggested the limitations 
of the Jewish immigration to 75,000 for the following f i v e years. They 
were to be settled only in a restricted area and there would not - be any 
further immigration after that period without the consent of the Arabs, 
The Jews feared that this proposal -woiiLd reduce their position to that 
of a permanent minority dominated by the Arabs, Now i t was the turn of 
the Jews to become agitated and organize violent activit ies against the 
British authorities. They said that the liiited Kingdom was going against 
the spirit of the Balfour Declaration which envisaged the creation of a 
separate state for them. The problem of displaced Jews intensified their 
grievances. As has been explained earl ier, in 1942 the International 
Zionist organisation called for the creation of a Jewish state, a Jewish 
Array and the opending of Palestine to unlimitted immigration's, 
2, Ibid. 
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The United King<iam was placed in a very d i f f i cu l t position. On the 
one hand she had to f i j l f i l her promises to the Arabs, maintained her 
friendship with them and deal with the united demands of the Arab States* 
On the other hand there were her own promises to the Jews, and the force 
and influence of Inter-national Jewry. After World W&r I I Britains 
pol i t ical influence and international prestige had considerably decreased 
and she had also to consider the interests of the two other Great Powers 
in this strategically important region. Meanwhile, the sitmtion in 
Balestine viQs becoming very tensejviolence and te iror ist activit ies vjere 
organised by both parties. I t was under these circTinstances that the 
liiited Kingdom invited the Tfcited States to cooperate with her in holding 
an inquiry into conditions in I^lestine and discovering a solution to 
the problem. Britain, her-self dependent igjon American sipport in the 
Second world i^r coiiLd not ignore American representation, but f e l t that 
the intervention of the U.S.A. in Palestine af fa irs should be mached by 
American willingness to share responsibility for the execution of policy. 
The only solution to their problem lay in the establishment of a Jewish 
state. 
At least the matter was referred to the U.N.General Assembly where 
the feature of Palestine raised many iarreconcilable views. The Arab 
states were as one, and were firm in their view that Palestine should be 
converted into a free and United State at an early date. The Jews stood 
for the creation of a separate state of their own. These conflicting 
approaches were reflected in the speeches at the f i r s t special session of 
the Assembly though i t had met for the purpose of constituting and 
instructing a special committee to consider the problem. 
In the end the British Government f e l t absolutely convanipnced that 
the mandate was injurious and unworkable. Consequently the IJiited Nations 
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sent i ts special Commission for Palestine to stidy the situation and make 
r ec ommendat ions • 
After studying the report of the Comraission the general Assembly 
decided on a scheme of partition on the 29th November 1947, Qpeat 
Britain made i t known that she would surrender the mandate at midnight 
on the 14th May 1948. The Indias couLd very well understand and appreciate 
that i t was the typical method of the British - they always administered 
a parting kick and l e f t some sources of tension and confusion in the 
comtry from liiich th^ witb-drew. 
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ATTITIDE — BEBIOHE INDEPENDENCE — MUSLIMS LEAGUE — 
NaTlONSL OONGRfiSS,AND THE INDIAN LEADERSHIP -
IN THE U.N^. 
The Indian attitude can be chronologically divided into two parts. 
The f i r s t phase of the issue troubled the Indians in general during the 
interwar period. The British had their strangle hold on Iiidia as well. 
Any entrenchment of the British Empire, direct or indirect would mean a 
L 
better barganing position and greater capacity to tighten i ts grip over 
the other cola{^ies and dependencies. That is India's reaction was voilent 
and her top leadership condemned the intrusion of Israel, with the active 
and secret sipport of these imperialists powers. The reaction of the 
Muslins (both Dleraas and Politicians) was more violent. For them i t was 
not only a pol i t ical isstie bub also a religiote one. The Indian Muslims 
have a l l along been very touchy abottfc the British manoevres in the west 
Asian region. 
The Khalifat movement in India, ^dxich gave a f i l i p to the freedom 
movement in this comtry v/as mainly directed against the British who 
have been engaged iJi pol i t ical manipulation in this region. The Muslims 
of India hated the British for three reasons:-(a) A large section of the 
Muslims justi f iably considered the Christians their main rivals in the 
real of religion and culture. I t vjere the Christians with whom the 
Muslims had to contend, and at whose hands they had suffered set backs. 
They were practically wiped out from Spain and in this race for domina-
tion throughout the later middle ages, both spiritual and itel lectual the 
Christians proved triumphant, (b) This fact was never forgetten by the 
Muslims world, and more particuarly by the Muslims in India, v;here the 
centuries old Mrelim empire was thrown into confusion and latifer demolished 
by the British imperialists. The Muslims in India never forget this 
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hmil iat ing stoke of fortune, and were always prepared to participate in 
any movement v^iich •was against the Christian powers more particularly the 
British. Their Hindu compatriots shared their sentiment for two rasons: 
f i r s t l y , the British Imperialists had spread their tentacles far and wide 
and India move to dominate economically and pol i t ica l ly any under developed 
region vQs opposed by them. Growing starength of the Imperialists forces 
would have evidently meant a postponment of the Indian emancipation. Any 
move to dable in west Asian pol it ics would have meant dominating a l l the 
routes to India. In the early twenties there was miversal displeasure in 
India expresed in varioi^s fonns against these imperialistic moves, west 
Asia was mi l i tar i ly the most strategic point, pol i t ical ly the most important 
area and economically the most useful. The Muslim Leagiie which claimed to 
represent the Muslims masses passed the following resolubions:-
"The lurking Committee of A l l India Muslim Leaige deeply diplore 
and strongly condemn the attit ide of the British Government and their 
policy in setting aside the declaration of the white Paper on Palestine 
under the presure and influence of the Jewish capatalists and the American 
Zionist propaganda which is backed t;?) and sigjported by the Goveimment of 
"instead of implementing the white P&per which laid down that a l l 
Jewish immigration into Bilestine should cease on the 1st of April 1946, 
the very readiness shown by the British Government to Join the Anglo-
American Committee on I^lestine and their being a party to the' sotting 153 
of this Committee with the object of reconsidering the Rilestine question 
mates i t clear beyond doubt that having shamelessly gone back ipon their 
pledges given to the Arabs from time to time, the British were s t i l l trying 
to find some excuse for demping more Jews on the Holy Land in order to 
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to please the American Jewry. 
"The Committee view that great concern and alaim the various 
reports emanating chiefly from U.S.cources suggesting the partitioning 
of Idlestine into Arab and Jewish divisions. This barbaric suggestion 
which is tantamount to depriving the Arabs of their own homelands by 
importitig fresh aliens national as emigrants, is a monstrous outiage 
and contempt of the basic principles of demoncracy and this would never 
be tolerated in any form or under any excuse or cover by the Arabs, as 
i t would clearly means reconquest of Iklestine by the Jews xjith the help 
of American and British baynets which is the aspiration and real objective 
of the Jews. 
"The working Ccnjmittee having considered carefully the s i t ^ i on 
in jfelestine and as i t is taking shape from day to day, are emphatically 
of the opinion that i f Jewish immigration, which is forcible and i l l ega l , 
does not cease immediately and i f the U.S.A, Government does not give i?) 
i ts anti-arabs and unscrigjlous policy in Arabia, the whole Middle iiast 
t/ill be l i t ip into a huge conflagration that would shatter the peace of 
the whole world, which is supporsedly so dear and of very deep concern 
both to the U.S.A. and the British Government but vdaich can only be 
achieved i f these Big powers can provide a sense of security to other 
smaller nations and peoples and respect their independence and their 
right to l i ve as independent and free people. 
"The Committee, therefore, assiire the Arab Leagie i^ich have now 
taken up the matter in their hands, and particuarly the Arab Higher 
Committee and its Chairman, that Muslim India wi l l stand by them and 
wi l l extend a l l support possible and as far as the circumstances allow 
wi l l coop^^te with them in securing the fredom of the Holy Land from the 
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clufcches of the British and in resisting and putting a stop to the 
onslaught of the Jewry packed i?) by the Uiited States of America 
The Cammittee urges tpon the British Government to meet the 
solemn pledges made to the Arabs and the Muslims of India who stood 
by then solidly in the Great war"2. 
"Jtesolved that Muslim Festivals siich as Id,Bakrid,Bara\tfat etc. 
should be celebrated in such a manner as to promote pol i t ical unity and 
social solidarity among the Muslims of India, and that these occasions 
shoiiLd be utilized fo r some useful and pol i t ical work in s'i:55port of the 
Mxjslim League, with this object in view, i t is further resolved, that 
the 27th of Eajab next (the day of the prophets' Miraj) should be 
observed as Palestine Day. The pgogramme to be observed on this day 
should include mess meetings and processions and a processions and 
vigorous e f for t should be made to collect subscriptions for the 
Palestine Arabs Belief fund, under the control of Palestine Fund 
Committee appointed by the working Committee in July last "3• 
An ikergency meeting of the working Committee of the All India 
Muslim League was held at Gul-e-Ptana, the residence of Nai^bzada 
Liaqat A l i Khan, Harding Avenue, New Delhi on the l7th and 18 of 
September 1939 under the Presidentship of Jinnah and the 
following resolution vins passed:-
«The policy of the British Government toxjai^s the Arabs in 
1* Tesdi of the Resoltrbions passed by the working Committee of the A l l India 
Muslim Leagije at i ts meeting held in Bombay from 26th July 1946 to 2nd 
Aug. 1946, under the Presidentship of Qaid-c-Azam Mohd.Ali Zinnah(Res«No.jpJ 
2. Test of Resolution of the meeting of the working Committee of the AH 
India Muslim Leage held at Mustafa-.Castle,Meerut, on Sunda the 2eth of 
March 1936 under the Presidenthsip of Mr.M.A. Jinnah(Resolution No,6)« 
Texb of Resolutions passed at the meeting of the Council of the Al l 
India Muslim League held in Delhi on the 27th and 28th of Aug. 1939, 
under the Presidentship of Mr Ja,a. Jinnah, (Resolution No«14). 
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Palestine has wotmded deeply Muslim feel ing in sentiment and a l l representa-
tions in that behalf have had no real e f fect so f<ur. The Cctumittee once 
more urges tpon His Majestry's Government to satisfy the Arab National 
Demands 
"That the Al l India Musldm League declares in the name of the 
Mussalmans of India that recommendations of the Royal Kilestine Coraraission 
and the subsequent statement of policy presented by the Secretary of 
State for the colonies to Kirliament conflict with their religious 
sentdjuents, and in the interests of the world peace demands its rescission 
without, further delay, 
"The A l l India Muslim League calls t?)on the Government of India 
to issue instructions to the representatives of India at the Assembly 
of the League of Nations that in view of the failure of the present 
mandatorj'- to carry out the terms of the mandate which was never accepted 
by the Arabs and the rest of the Islamic World and in order not to 
prejMice the Civi l and religious rights of the Ai^bs they shall demand 
the annulments of the mendate and disasseciate themselves from any 
decision tending to perpetrate i t and tht© to voilate the fmdamental 
right of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to choose the foim of 
Govemmenfc best suited to their needs and reqviirements as guaranteed 
to them under International treates, 
"The A l l India Muslim League app-eals to the rulers of Muslim 
countries to continue to use their powerful influence and befrfc 
endeavours to save the holy places in Ifelestine from the sacrilege of 
non-Muslim domination and the Arabs of the Holy Land from enslavement 
of British's Imperialism backed by JeT,ri.sh influence. 
"The A l l India Mrelim League expresses i ts entire confidence in 
the Leader and Members of the Delegation selected by the Palestine 
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Conference held on September 24, and 25,1937 and appeals to every friend 
of the Arabs in Palestine to riase a united voice to redress their 
grievances. 
"^his session of the A l l India Muslim League varms the British 
Govemment that i f i t f a i l s to alter i t s present pro-Jewish polic;^ in 
Palestine the Mussalmans of India in consonance with the rest of the 
Islamic world wi l l look ipon Britain as the enemy of Islam and shall be 
forced to adopt a l l necessary measures according to the dictates of their 
fa i th" l* 
In 1928, the congress warmly assured the people of Egypt, Syria, 
Palestine and Iraq of i ts fu l l sympathy with them in their struggle to 
f ree themselves frcM the grip of western of Imperialism which in i ts 
view was also a great menance to the Indian struggle. 
The following resolution was passed 
"This congress sends its warmest greetings to the People of Egypt, 
Syria, I&lestine and Iraq and i ts assurances of f u l l sympathy with them 
in their striiggle for emancipation from the gript of western Imperialism, 
vpbiich is, in the opinion of the Congress, a great menace to India's 
stri:iggle for freedom''2» 
A^ early as 1922, G.R»Dass in his presidential address had 
advised India^ to keep themselves in^^ch vdth world movements and with 
A 
the love i « of fi^edom all^ver the world. Not mtxL after the Brussels 
congress, however, did this become a recurrent them^ in the pronounce-
ments of the Congress leaders or affected their action, Mr.Nehru 
described the Brussels congress as the outward symbol of the intense 
desire for mutual cooperation which had taken possession of the oppressed 
and the exploited a l l over the world. He warmed that in India in her 
1. Text of Resolutions passed at the Twentyfifth Annml session of the 
All India Muslim League on the 15th, I6th, 17th and 18th of Oct. 1937 
at Lucknow with Mr. Jinnah in the Chair. 
2. The Indian National Congress 1928.Being the Resolutions passed by the 
Congress, the A l l India Congress Ccsnmittee and the working Camittee 
during the year 1928. Calcutta Congress Session 1928 Dec.29,50,& 5i 
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own interests as vjell as in the interests of the world couLd not afford 
to reniain isolated from the great movements and forces viiich were shaping 
the future. At this sxiggestion the Congress in 1927, decided to a f f i l i a t e 
I tse l f with the Leauge against Imperialism as an associate member. In 
1928, the Congress declared that the Indian struggle was part of the 
general world struggle against imperialism and hence desired that $Bidba 
India should develope contacts with other countries and peoples vAio 
were also coopbating imperialism. I t also decided to open a Foreign 
Department in i ts o f f ice to develope such contacts. 
In defence as well as in foreign affdirs i t was Mr.Nehru rather 
than Gandhiji who showed the keener interest and whose voice generally-
prevailed. 
Mr.Nehru took the opportunity presented by the brieg raspite 
from prision in 1933, to share his thoughts with his countryman through 
a series of articles on the national and international situation which 
were subsequently puKLished in a pamphlet entitled "whiter I n d i a H e r e 
he emphasized that i t was only in a world perspective that the Indian 
I 
problem could be properly understood. 
i'7ath Mr .Nehru's assumption of the presidency of the Congress in 
April 1936, thSse views became the fomdation of the Indian Nationalist 
oiiblook on world a f fa i rs . In his presidential address he devoted a good 
deal of space to his analysis of the world situation and called tpon 
the congress to identify i tse l f vdth the nationalist and socialist 
forces in the world struggling against Imperialism and Fascism, the 
tvro forces of decaying capitalism. 
The Congress followed the lead given by Mr.Kehru and between 1936 
and 1939, extended i ts sympathy and st?3port to a l l victims of Fascism 
and imperialism in Abyssinia, Spain, China and jfelestine. The I^lestin4»vx 
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imbroglio also attracted the attention of the congress. I ts sympathies 
were entirely on the sdde of the Arabs in their struggle against British 
rule as well as against the aims of Zionists. Despite i ts sympathies for 
the Jews in view of their perseciibion in Europe, i t considered i^lestine 
a» Arab country and deplored the ef forts of Zionists to establish 
themselves there under the cover of British armed might. Mr.Nehru 
e3!i>lained his thinking on this question in an art icle in June 1936. He^ 
made i t clear at the outset that for from harbouring any prejvfiic against 
the Jfewish people, he had every sympathy with them, especially in view 
of their tragic Plight in Europe. Few people, he wote , could withhold 
their deep sympathy from the Jeijs for the long centuries of the most 
terrible oppression to v^iich they had been subjected a l l over Europe. 
Fewer s t i l l could repress their indination at the barbarities and racial 
suppression of the Jews viiich the Nazis had indulged in during the last 
few years, and xAiich continued t i l l that day. The art ic le runs as follows 
"My ejqjression of sympathy with the Arab National movement and 
their struggle for freedom has brought me some protests from Jews in 
India.. But my reading of war-time and post-war history shows 
that there was a gross betroyal of the Arabs by the British impererialism. ^ 
The many promises that were made to them by Gilonel Lawrence and others, 
on behalf of the British Government, and which resulted in the Arabs 
helping the British and Allied Bavrers during the war, were consistently 
ignored after the war was over- «»«,»»!feving been promised 
freedom and independence repeatedly from 1915 onwards, siddently they 
found themselves converted into a mandatory territory with a new burden 
added on - the promise of the creation of a national ham.e for the jews - a 
burden which almost made i t impossible for them to realize independence*....< 
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"Such case as the Zionist has might be called a moral one their 
ancient associations with their Holy Land their reverrence for i t one may 
sympatheise with i t . Bxifc what of Arabs? For them also i t was Holy Land -
both for M-i:Blims and Christian Arabs. For thirteen hundred years and 
more they have lived their and a l l their aracial and national interests 
had taken strong roots t h e r e . . . , , , , , , , , , , , , , , 
"It is quite possible that a number of Jews might have fomd 
welcome in Palestine and settled down there. But when the Zionist came 
with the avowed object of ptehing out the Arabs from a l l places of 
importance and of deminating the country, they could hardly be welcome. 
"The problem of jfelestine is thus essentially a nationalist one - a 
people struggling for independence against imperialist control and 
exploitation. I t is not a racial or religious one.... I f the Je^ js 
had been wise they would have throijn in their left with the Arab strviggle 
for independence. Instead they have chose to si ie x i^th the British 
imperialism and to seek i ts protection against the people of the 
comtry 
"India and Rilestine have both their national problems and bcrbh 
struggle for independence, they have something in caramon in this struggle 
and the oppenent is the same., , , , , , , , , , . , , , , 
iipeaking on occasion of the i^lestine Day on September 27, 1936 in 
Allahabad. Mr .Nehru said: "The Jeijs have been and are the victims of a 
cruel fascism and we must f ee l for their s^5)perings• I t is misfortune 
that they should allow themselves to be exploited in I^lestine by British 
imperialism. Their future in F&lestine l ies in cooperfition with the Arabs 
and in recognition of the fact that f&lestine is and must continue to be 
essentially an Arab comtry. Our sympathies and good wishes must go OTIT to 
the people of Rilestine in this Jour of their d i s t r e ss . « , . . , , . . • , • . , , , " 2 . 
I . Jawfeiiamax iNeniu—i' lgnteen Months i n I nd i a . 1936-37. 
P.127-131. 
2 . I b i d . P . 136 -138 . 
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His reading of history, however, led Mr.Nehru to conclude that the 
happenriJigs in Palestine since the Balfour Declaration represented a 
betrayal of Arabs, by British Imperialism. He admitted that the Jevs had 
a right look t o Jerusalem as their Holy Land and to have free'access to 
i t , bub pointed out that the Balfotir Declaration ijent much beyond that 
i t envisaged the creation of a Jewish iitate within an Arab community 
which was to grow in number and ecomic strength t i l l i t dominated the 
whole of i^ lest ine. Besides, Palestine was also a Holy Land for the irabs 
Muslims as well as Christian, who had lieved their f o r thirteen hundred 
years or more, and not empty with ultimated scope fo r new colonization. 
I t is possible, Mr.Wehru continued, f o r a certain number of Jews 
to go and sett le in I^lestine in an atomosphere of peace and good-will, 
biib when went with the object of dcMiinating the coxmtry, they could 
hardly expect t o be welcomed by the Arabs, "Fundamentally the problem 
of Ifeilestine was f o r Nehru a nationalist one: the arabs were struggling 
against inperial ist control and domination. I t was a pity, therefore, 
that the Jews of Palestine instead of aligning themselves with that 
struggle had thought i t f i t to take the side fo r British imperialism and 
to seek i ts protection against the inhibitants of the country."l. 
Against this backgrounds, the congress working Committee in 1936, 
sent i t s greetings to the Arabs of I^lestine and sympathised with them in 
their struggle f o r independence. The underscore i t s attitude the congress 
observed September 27,1336, as Palestiias Day by holding meetings and 
demonstrators throughout the country in support of the Arabs. One of the 
resolutions rms as follows 
"The Committee record their emphatic protest against the regin of 
terror that has been established in Palestine by British Imperialism with 
a view to coerce the Arabs into accepting the proposed partition of 
1. Prof.Birala Prasad - Origins of India Foreign Policy . 
Pages 130-131. 
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Palestine and ensure them of the solidarity of the Indian people with 
them in their strt:iggle for national freedom"2. 
when after the sT:?)pression of Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936, 
the British Government introduced repressive measures and intitiated 
talks for partition, the congress come fon^rd in sipport of the Arabs 
and the above referred resolution was passed* 
In October 1937, the Al l India Congress Committee recorded i ts 
emphatic protest against the reign of terror said to have been instituted 
in Palestine with the aim of coercing the Arabs into accepting partition. 
In Febri&ry 1938 the annijal session of the Congress returned once more 
to the subject of Palestine, condemning the plan for partition, protesting 
against the repressive policy of British, and expressing sympathy with 
the Arabs. The rearolution runs as under 
"The Congress condemns the decision of Great Britain as a I i^andatory 
power to bring abottb the partition of Palestine in the teenth of opposi-
tion of the Arabs and the appointment of a Coraraission to cari'y oul thi^ 
project 
"The Congress escpress i ts fu l l sympathy with the Arabs in their 
struggle for national freedom and their f ight against Britain Imperialism, 
"The Congress holds that the proper method of solving the problem 
by viiich the Jews and the Arabs are faced in Palestine is by amicable 
settlement between themselves and appeals to the Jews not to seek the 
shelter of the British Mandatory and not to allow themselves to be 
exploited in the interest of British Imperialism"!, 
2, Indian National Congress 1935-37.Being the resolutions passed by the 
Congress, the Al l India Congress Committee and the working Canmittee 
dT:irlng the period between April 1936 to Jan. 1938(Calcubba,October 29,30, 
and 31, 1937). 
1, Fisher S.N.- The Middle East( A history) (London 1959) Page 439, 
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Towards the end of 1938, the growing persecttfcion of Jews in 
Germany and the Arab Jewish confl ict in Palestine led both Qandhiji and 
Mr.Wehru to discuss the whole Jewish question at some length, Gandhiji 
condemned the persectction of Jews in Germany in very strong terms. 'Hif 
there ever could be a just i f iable war", he wrote, "in the name and f o r 
hunsnity, a war against Geiraany, t o prevene the wanton perseciifcion 
of a x^hole race, would be completely Justi f ied". Gandhiji, however, 
did not syiupatheise with the idea of a Jewish national home, and saw no 
reason why the Jews should not, l ike other peoples of the earth, make 
their comtry their home where they were bom and where they earned 
their l ivelihood. I f the Jews maintained that they had no home bxifc 
Palestine, woiold they rel ish the idea of being forced oiib of the other 
parts of the world? or d i i they yant^ S a double home? Kilestine belonged 
to the Arabs in the same sense that England belonged to the En^ish 
or Franch to the French, I t is vrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on 
the Arabs.... 
Gandhiji had no doubt that the Jews in i^lestine were proceeding 
in the wrong way,"if religioxis conviction drew them to the idea of the 
national home, they should give i?) their reliance on force and t ry to 
win the Arab heart'll. 
On July 14,1946, Gandhiji wote on Jews and i^lestine. 
"tE do believe that the Jews have been cruelly wronged by the 
world. "Getto" is so far as I am aware, the name given to the Jewish 
locations in many piirts of Europe 
The world should have been their h^e , i f only for the saI<B of 
their distinguished contribution to i t why should they depend 
on American money or British arms for forcing themselves on an unwelcome 
land. "2. 
1. Prof.Bimla Prasad - Origins of In ian Foreign Policy.Pages 132,33, & 34. 
2. Tendulkar D.G. - Mahatma Vol. 11"^  1945 - 1947. 
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Mr.Nehrp entirely agreed with "Gandhijl's views on the Jewish 
problem. Mr.Nehru thought i t xmfortunate that the Jews had aligned 
themselves with British imperialism. By doing so they had not even 
served their own interests, for British imperialism had had i ts day 
and was fading away. These views \jere also reflected in the resolution 
of the next annual session of the congress held in March 1939. I t 
referred to the previous expressions of sympathy with the Arabs in 
Palestine and conveyed to them greetings and good wishes for complete 
success. The resoliition stated:-
"The Congress has previously declared i ts f u l l sympathy with the 
Arabs in i^lestine in their struggle for National freedom and their 
f ight agaiast British Imperialism and has condemned the policy of 
mandatory power in I^lestine, The congress trusts that 
the Arabs and Jews wi l l endeavour to find a basis for direct cooperation 
with a view to establishing an independence democratic state in 
Palestine with adeqwte protection of Jewish rights "1. 
After independence the attitude of Indian Government and the 
Indian public opinion in general was more in favour of the newly 
independent and emerging nations of the Arab countries. This attitiJde 
was mainly due to (a) Libjieral leadership which had a l l along s\;5)porbed 
the Arab cause (b) the secular character of the state which was more in 
keeping with the Arab approach in respect of their own domestic policies, 
(c) The age-old cultural t ies of these regicais with India. Many culttiral 
currents i^ich constituted composite culture of India has( flowed in 
from the west Asian regions. The impact of that culture in Indian 
1. Indian National Congress - March 19S9 to Jan. 1940,Being the resolutions 
passed by the congress, the All India Congress Committee and the 
wording Committee during the period between March 1939 to Jan. 1940 
(Tripuzs, 1-lhakoshaj March 10,11, and 12,1939). 
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national l i f e was great and called for a homogenlety in outlook, (d)India 
always sympathised with the countries which had fallen a prey to the 
Imperialist designs and was always prepared to help in clearing 15) the 
political-cob-webs which these imperialist had woven around a l l soch 
peoples,(e) India was follower and an advocate of the policy of non-
alignment and she wanted to help these nations v^ich were being dragged 
into the vartex of coldwsr and whose economy and polit ical stabi l i ty was 
being threatened by such moves,(f) Economically India's interest were 
bound more with this regions. They were, besides sv^jpliers of Oi l , 
the main countries which imported Indism goods. India has qviite 
substantial trade with these countries, (g) Suez Canal was the s^a- only ^ ^ 
link between India and the wes"^  World. I f Suez Canal is closed indefinitly 
or i f the area around i t is in a state of pol it ical flux, India stcOidj, 
to lose. 
For these reasons India w«nt al^out to support the Arab countries, 
w 
ap;;jrovingly looked at the satiment of Arab nationalism and actively 
supported them in International Councils and the I3n.ited Nations. 
Ever since the National (Government of India began to send her 
accredited representatives to the IJiited Nations Conferences, they had 
been proclaiming not only the adherence of the country to the principle 
and ptirposes of the Tfoited Nations, emodied in the Charter, bub also 
the determination of her people to help to strengthen the organisation* 
I t is India's fa i th in the world organisation that encouraged her to 
refer to i t question of treatment of Indian in Soiibh Africa and Pakistan's 
complicity in the invasion of Kashmir. India is convinccd that only the 
Ihited Nations provides the machinary fo r peaceful settlement of disputes 
between nations. On many issues her delegates have^be«tt independent stand 
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in line with the declarations of their Gorvernment that India -was not 
prepared to f a l l in with the members of any block. On the question of 
jfelestine, this independent policy of India vas very striking. Among the 
important matters that came before the liiited Nations this was the only 
one on which the U.S.S.H. and the U.S. though for difference reasons, 
found, themselves in aggcement. Both suggested partition of the country. 1» 
India did not agree with this view and suggested a deferal Palestine 
instead of a unitary state. 
Those who proposed partition were Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guantemala, 
the Netherlands, Peru, Sewden Urugnay, Their plan envisaged the establish-
ment of an Arab state, a Jewish state and the placing of the city of 
Jerusalem under international trusteeship. The Plan sxibnitted by India, 
Iran and logogoslavia was based in the creation of a Federal state of 
r&,lestine. Within the federation there would txjo aufchonomous iVrab and 
Jewish states. For a period of throe years Jews »ould be allowed to 
immigrate into their state to extend compatible with i ts absorptive 
capacity as determined by an International Gcsnmission. 
The second session of the Assembly in September 1947 considered, 
along with the report of the Committee, a proposal by Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq that mandate should be terminated and Palestine recognized as an 
independent unitary state. The A-ssembly rejected the plan for a flederation 
as well as the plan for a unitary state of jRalestine and accepted the 
recommendations of the majority plan of the special Coraraittee, \^iich 
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provided for the partition of the comtry into separate Jevish and Arab 
stcites, bo-und together by a system of economic union, with an international 
area for Jerusalem. 
A Ccsrnraission \]as created to implement Assembly's decision and to 
assist the Mandatory Power performing i ts fmctions ipto the tins of 
the termination of the mandate. The Security Comcil was requested to 
take necessary measures, as provided for in the plan, for its implementa-
tion and to determine as a threat to peace, branch of peace or act of 
aggressions, or any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by 
the plan. 
The resolution containing these recommendations was accepted by the 
Assembly by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abdentions. Among those who 
supported the resolution were 15 European countries(including Soviet 
liiion), 13 Latin American States, the U.S., four Commonwealth Countries, 
the Philiphines and Liberia, Al l the Asian states opposed i t , except 
China which asbtained and Siam whose representative v;as absent. 
In accordance with the Assembly's resolution, the Security Council 
took cognizance of the resolution of 9 December 1947 and the Trusteeship 
Council engaged i tse l f in preparing a draft state for Administering the 
city of Jerusalem. 
Conditions in Balestine vrere not very encouraging for the U.N. 
Palestine Commission to perform i ts functions. Early in 1948 the Governments 
ard organisations of the world declared that they did not recognize 
the val idity of the Aseonbly's decision and would not accept the partition 
of the comtrj"-. The Jews, on the other hand, demanded that liiited Nations 
should implement i t s decision, i f necessary by force. 
The Commission's report made i t clear that i t was impossible for i t 
to f u l f i l i ts decisions unless the Security Council compelled the parties 
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to agree to eassy oub the provision of the resolution of 29 November 1947« 
This wovild mean providing the Commission with armed assistance to enable 
i t to discharge i ts responsibil it ies. 
The special session of the Assembly met in April 1948. The f i r s t 
resolution adopted by the Assembly called tgjon persons and organizations 
in jfelestine t o cease a l l military and violent act iv i t ies and to refrain 
pending the General Assembly's further considecation of the issue, from 
any po l i t i ca l ac t iv i ty viiich might prejudice the rights and claims of 
either ccsram-unity. 
Bub bitter f ighting continiBd in Palestine, This was intensified 
u 
to a very high degree af ter the withdra;a of British forces on 15 May, 
The discussion in the special session of the Assembly had in the 
meantime made i t clear that the U«S. proposal f o r establishing a temporary 
tr i j^eship fo r Palestine would not sec\a:« the required two-thirds 
majority, A resolution of the Assembly called a l l (Governments and 
organisations interested in Palestine to secure a truce in Rilestine 
as early as possible. 
The jfelestine Commission ms also relieved by this resolution 
from further exercise of i ts authority". Instead the resolution provided 
f o r the appointment of a United Nations Mediator vtiose chief function 
vias to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in I^lestine, 
The U.NJyIediator had to perform his functions in sxirroundings 
which were very hostile to him. The Jews vere very dissatisf ied with the 
non-implementation of the General Assembly's resolution of November 1947, 
Almost simultaneously with the termination of the United Kingdom mandate 
they established a Provisional (Government which proclaimed the independence 
of the State of Israel , 
The situation was more complicated by the action of E ^ t , Trans Jordan, 
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Iraq, Syria and Labenon who become involved in a war against the Jews and 
their new state. 
The Security Gomcil*s resolrtbion soon had their e f fect and 
host i l i t ies ceased on 1st June, Much of the credit f o r the observance of 
the cease-fire must go to the Mediator and his military'- observers, who 
worked mder most tmfavourable circumstances. On 28 June he oufc-lined his 
pla4 for the settlement of the dispute. In accordance with this plan, 
Palestine would be a Udlori of two loembers, one Arab and one Jewish, 
Both parties rejected this plan and there were continous breaches of 
the truee during A\;igust, Count Bemadotte, the Mediator, informed the 
Security Council of his concern and stated that the situation -vreis repidly 
getting wrose. He subnitted another plan on 16 September but on 17 Sept, 
the day on which the Mediator's pw?posals i^re forwarded to the United 
Nations - he was assassinated by irregulars in the Jevdsh - held terr i tory 
of Jeruslem, 
The problem of idlestine came tro before the General Assembly in 
i ts third session. During the debate in the Po l i t i ca l Gommittee, India 
reiterated her opposition to the partition of Bilestine, Her delegate 
stiggested that the General Assembly should adopt the proposal f o r a 
federal state, with autonomous Jewish and Arab Areas, No solution of the 
problem, -v i^ich v/as not based on the consent of the Arabs, could be 
considered r , satisfactory'- by India, 
Britain, supported by the U.S., at f i r s t subaitted a resolution 
endorsing the Bemadotte plan for Palestine, The Soviet delegate accused 
both Britain and United States of manoeiwring to shape Palestine to their 
own interest. He supported due-right reaffixmen"'—tion of the original 
1947 partition plan. 
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The Pol i t ical Committee accepted this proposal of Cireat Britain. 
I t gave the consileation Commission a broad mandate to seek agreement 
between the Arabs and the Jews* The Commission was to draw ip detailed 
proposals for a permanent international regime for Jerusalem. 
On the whole there was a distinct improvement in the I^lestine 
situation towards the end of 1949. But some aspects of the problem s t i l l 
remained to be solved. 
India's attitude towards the problem was influenced by many-
factors. On this issue Muslims in a l l parts of the world had taken a 
clear stand favouring the Arabs. The Mtjslim states of West Asia and 
I^kistan had taken a keen interest in Palestine and uncompromisingly 
opposed the idea of partition. The Government of India, liiich wanted 
to encourage cooperation among Asian comtries in the International 
f i e ld , could not afford to antagoize those states by adopting a different 
policy of this issue. Moreover, India had also to take note of the fact 
that Pakistan had tried to make capital out of the Hindu - Muslim 
disturbances in, this countiy by propagating the view that her Government 
was hostile to the Muslims, igain, the feelings of Sixty Millions 
MiBlim in India on this matter were also important. 
Another factor vAiich influenced India's decision was her own 
experience of partition, weighting the merits of the issije, India could 
not agree with the view that, because many Jews were i l l -treated by the 
Europeans, Palestine shotild provide a home for them. She f e l t that the 
Palestine probl^ mtist be separated from that of the Jewish refugees 
of Europe. 
These facts led India ncrt to give iomneidate recognition to Israe l . 
Btt there was a gradual realization in this cotjitry that the nev; state 
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had come to stay and that i t had to be recognized one day. 
While speaking at the Ifciited Nations the Indian representative 
Mr.Asaf A l i said: " I appeal to everyone concerned that peace shoxjld be 
the aim of a l l , in so f a r as ifelestine is concerned*.. . . « . . . . «•. .•. . .This 
time has now come when the conscience of himanity must be around to 
the fact, that, that land shall remain the sanctuary and shrine of 
peace forever. idlestine has become the acid test on human 
conscience. The United Nations wi l l find ••lii that rpon i ts decision wiU 
depend the fubure of humanity; they wi l l decide whether htaaanity is going 
to proceed by peacefull means or hijnanity is going to be torn to 
peaces. 
Do not think of constitutionality; i t is the determination of 
the people that comts - I know. The i^lestinians have a determination 
of their own. No one can possibly wipe that determination oiib; no, not 
even the Uaited Nations. The can wipe out Balestijie, they can whipe otcb 
the I^lestinians, bub they cannot wipe out the determination, the soul 
of the people. Do not be impatient 1. 
while the British representative. Sir Ale:?ander Gadogan,favovired 
the Jewish ^ency, Mr.Asaf Ali ( lndia) wanted the Arab higher Committee 
to be beared by the members of the General Assembly. Mr.Asaf A l i said: 
" It has been said that the Jewish agency was mentioned in the mandate. 
This is true. However, I find that, even before the Jewish agency is 
mentioned in Article 4 of the mandate, the poeple inhabiting Rilestine 
1, Ifiiited Nations- O f f i c i a l Record of the First Special session of the 
General Assembly. Vol, I Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly 
Verbatin Hecord. 28 April - 15 May 1947, Continmtion of the discussion 
of the report of the f i r s t Committee(documents A/307 and A 307 corr I^ , 
are mentioned in Article ZZ of the Covenant of the Leagie of Nations, 
which is of peimanent importance. I t is dmpossible for me to under-stand 
how VQ can hear one section of the popiiLation and not hear a considerable 
portion- infact, a majority - of the population of I&lestine, and come 
to any conclusion ijhatsoever... 
I do not see how i t is possible for any body to make 153 his mind 
about the actvsil iss-ues involved in the question which is going to be 
refeired to the Goramittee imless he has beared a l l side^l. 
1. United Nations - O f f i c ia l Record of the First spefiial session of 
the General Assembly VQQ.,111 Main Committees - Verbatin Records of 
meetings, 28 April - 13 May 1947, 
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CHAPTER I I I . 
THE FIRST CONFLICT THE MIGRATION OF THIS ARABS — THE Rt3FUC3E 
PAD ELM AND THE INDIAN ATTITIDE, 
In the words of Fisher", "After world war I I the world at large 
became greatly concemed with a f fa i rs of the Middle East. The advent 
of the 5tate of Israel and the enormous flow of o i l focused attention 
upon the area and emphasized its importance in matters of polit ics, 
I 
transportation, communication, religion, culture, markets, military 
strategy, imperialism, and nationalism, ahips f lying the f lags of more 
than f i f t y different nations passed through the Suez Canal every year. 
No nation or people could ignore the evolving problems of the Middle 
E a s f l . 
with the signing of the last of the armistices between Israel 
and Syria in July 1949, the Israeli-Arab war had o f f i c i a l l y come to an 
end. Bub the crucial part of i t was that these agreement were mere 
armistices; they did not create a state of peaceful relations between 
Israel and her Arab neighbours. It-was, therefore, not surprising that 
the years following the signing of the armistices would see the 
continuation of the Arab-Israeli clashes through devices other than 
large scale military action that might be characterised as war. The 
feel ing of humiliation and frtistration suffered by a l l the Arab states 
alike increased the Arab hatred for the new state of Israel. The resixLt 
was that Israel could not establish normal pol i t ical and economic 
relations with the states that sorrounded her entire land frontier. 
This state of isolation encouraging and engendering a feel ing of peri l 
and emergency in the comtry resulted in a research for exfcemal STjpport 
which, in i ts turn, stood in the way of Is3?ael developing normal 
1. Fisher S.N. The Middle East A History. 
P.544. London, R. & K. Paul Ltd. 
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relation with her Arab neighbottrs. That seme of the external svpport 
sought by Israel came from povrers themselves vere deeply involved 
in conflict with some of the Middle East Arab states, created further 
barriers on the path of Israeli-Arab understanding. 
The crusade in support of Zionism, however, had trimphed in 
Israel in a manner that was not foreseen by even the most optimistic 
among the Zionist zealots".1. By the time hosti l i t ies had completely 
ceased, 70 per cent of the area of mandatory ftilestine made t?) Israel 's 
terr i tor ies inhabited by 759,000 Jews and a non-Jewish population of 
only approximately 38,000. The state of Israel had been recognized by 
the Uiited States and the Soviet Uhion as soon as i t was proclaimed. I t 
was admitted to the Tiiited Nations soon aften^ards. I t couLd, therefore, 
look fon^ird to the world organisation and the two leading powers for 
protection againct future Arab onslaughts. I t was in this way that the 
Arab wolf could be kept away from i ts doors. The problems of the new 
state were primarily those of economic consolidation and v iab i l i ty . 
The greatest lowers in this conflict were the I^lestinian Arabs. 
Some 52 per cent of the Arab population of mandatory idlestine had become 
refugges and another 17 per cent were rendered destitute. Of the refugees, 
some 65 per cent or 280,000 Joined the 300,000 residents in that part of 
Palestine that remained Arab and was joined up with TransJordan. In the 
cramped Gaza strip occupied by the Egypt 20Qjj000 refugees came to l i ve 
in extreme distress vjith the 70,000 indigent Arabs already resident there• 
Small groigjs were scattei^d in other Arab countries. These people had noft 
only lost everything-their lands, their homes, their country - they had 
no hope of ret Timing to their homes. But since they were turned into 
refugees, they could not directly redress the situation. ThSir only 
1. Kinchejon — Seven Fallen Pil lars - The Middle Bast 1945-52 New York . 
P.439. 
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function remains a negati^ one, namely providing grist to the mill of 
Arab Loagiae's anti-Israel polit ics and evoking the sympathy of the world 
due to their pathitically miserable l iv ing conditions. 
Egypt Ti^ich was the main belligerent among the Arab coui:itries also 
turned out to be the main loser. For Jordan which was the second main 
party in the Arab coalition, defeat was recompensed by terr i tor ia l gains. 
But iigypt which might have obtained the Negev retained only the Gaza strip 
with 200,000 Arab refugees to boot. The only gain historically for 
Egypt was the revolubion in 1952, But in post-revolution Egypt the galling 
memory of defeat at the haads of the Zionists did not die. On the contrary, 
the young army leaders of revolutionary Egypt believed that they had been 
betrayed by the old regime and that, therefore, i t was their solemn duty 
to avenge the defeat. The misery and the hopelessness that marked the lot 
of the Palestine refugees provided them with the occasion to f u l f i l their 
wish to avenge defeat as viell as f ight for a righteous cause to bring 
jTjstice to their bi^other-Arabs of Palestine. 
I t is an undeniable fact that what the Zionist call the 'State of 
Israe l ' is a piece of land, a part of Arab Palestine which was handed over 
to them by the great powers of the world. I t did not belong to them. 
I t is snatched from the Arabs by the use of brute force. The present 
rulers of the so-called State of Israel have no legal claim over a 
terr i tory a majority of whose residents is thrown out at the point of 
bayonets. The partition resolvffiion'adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
was a violation of the principles of national self-determination and no 
organization, however, powerful i t may be, has no right to decide the 
fate and future of a people without their consent. In this case the 
Palestinian Arabs were completely ignored and an alien Government •was 
imposed on them. The partition resolution gave a prefrential treatment 
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to the Zionists because the area handed over to the Jewish State comprised 
f i f t y six percent of the total area of Palestine and only half of its 
inhabitants were Jetts vrfio owned less than nine percent of its land area. 
Also the unilateral proclamation of the establishement of a Zionists State 
on a land vjhich did belong to the occvgjants was juridically invalid 
because the Mandate for Palestine was declared teminated on that day and 
the status of the country was therefore subject to detenmination by the 
manority of i ts people. Moreover, the provisions of the U.N. resolutions 
were to come into force two months after the withdrawal of British forces. 
But the Zionist enclave was brought into being by the rise of violence and 
force. " I t was given to the world as f a i t accompli." ^ 
Today Israel occt?3ies forth- f i f th of the land of P-alestine. I t is 
according to international law and to a l l codes and tenets of Justice, 
an i l l ega l occupation. The establishment of this enclave has uprooted 
over 1,246,885 Palestinian Arabs xjho l i ve on doles in tents, camps and 
barraclcs. Their land confiscated by the Zionists terrorists and their 
property looted, their women raped and their kith and kin murdered on the 
streets. I t is the greatest hunan tragedy v/hich can befall on a group 
of human beings. The Arabs who are l le f t behind in Israel l i ve as second 
class citizens and in miLitarj^ camps. The plight of the Arab refugees 
provoked the distinguished British historian and statesman, Arnold-
Toynbee, to comment: * In taking the J&lostine .;rab's homes and property 
by force, the Israe l i ' s are sinning ncrt only against their own 
conscience, in the light of their own people»s past experience, biit also 
against the conscience of manftind. . I t is a moral tragedy 
Libenthal, Alfred M . VJhat Price Israel, Chicago. 1953. 
i^ge 247. 
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that the descendants of the Jewish exiles should have inflicted on the 
present day Arab population of Palestine the wrong which their ovjn 
ancestors once suffered. Vihat hope is there for the hman nature i f we 
in f l i c t on others the very wrongs that we ourselves have suffered? The 
experience of having been victims should deter us from victimising our 
fel low human beings The present situation in Bilestine is 
tragic but the refugees have not forf ieted their rights. They are s t i l l 
the lawful owners of their homes and property. They s t i l l have the 
right to l ive in their own homes and their own comtry. Infact they 
have the same fundamental human rights as every one in the world... 
In my belief no attempt to settle the I^lestine problem can be permanent-
l y successful unless i t does jxistice to the rights of Palestine's Arab 
inhabitants .1 shotild take to see the greatest possible number 
of the Palestinian Arab refugges not only to recover their homes and 
property biit return home under a Palestinian Arab Governmental. 
The tregedy of the Arabs inside the f&lestine has become ao 
unbearable and they present such pathetic of misery that i t even provoked 
the well known Jev/ish philosopher Martin Buber, to charge his Government 
that " Israel had imbued her Arab inhabitants with the feeling that they 
were second rate citizens both by things done to them and things not 
done".2. 
India's position on the problem of Arab refugees is clear. I ts 
mequivocal in demanding that they should be given back the possession 
of their land and property without any conditions. This stand is constant 
and has been expressed by the Indian Government representatives in the 
United Nations on more than one occasion. But the refugees problem is 
1. Toynbee Arnold — Egyptian Gazettee, Cairo. December 18, 1961. 
2. Buber Martin, New York Times January 18,1962. 
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not the only problem the Arabs face becaxise of the Zionist enclave in their 
midst. The rulers in Tel-Avive are a constant source of danger to tlae Arab 
countries. 
Since the Palestinian refugees forcibly evicted from their country 
have a distinct pol i t ical personality of their om, and are determined 
to get back the land from which they have been dispossessed, the question 
of exploiting them for pol it ical reasons by any of the Arab States dones 
not arise at all.Dr.Davies, the former Director of the United Nations 
i^rks and Relief Agency for the I^lestinian Refugees, while contradicting 
charges of pol i t ica l expolitation by the Arab Governments, said in a 
speech delivered before the Conference of voluntary agencies in Geneva 
on 18 January 1961: « The Palestine refugees problem has defied pol i t ical 
solution, not becaT:B6 of alleged whims of Arab politicians or the reputed 
shiftless nature of the refugees, btrti because of depth and universality 
of the conflict between Arabs and Israeles". He also said that Arab 
Governments had been most geneous in making every possible contribii-
tion to the welfare of the Arab refugees. 
Thus, i t should be clearly bons in mind that the position of Arab 
Government visa-vis the idlestinian refvigees is like that of a brother 
offering help and hospitality to another t>rother who has been i l l ega l l y 
dispossessed of his hcane and hearth by some outside intrxxiers.Obviously, 
the dispossessed brother would not l ike to become a permanent l i ab i l i t y 
on the brother who has given him shelter, and would remain eager to 
explore a l l possible means for regaining his property. Similarly the Arab 
refugees abhour possibility of renomcing their just claims to their 
own land and being absorbed somewhere else, as that would put a seal of 
approval on the heinous crimes the Zionists have committed against them. 
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The Arab States, have on eveiy occasion, declared at the IMited 
Nations willingness to resettle in their countries those refugees who 
wish to be settled after they have signified their choice betv/een 
repatriation and resettlement, in accordance with the U.N.resolutions. 
4s fo r back as 1955, Ambassador Kamil AbdaiL Rahim, speaking in the General 
Assembly on behalf of the Arab states, said, " The Arab countries would 
be quite prepared to x;elcome a l l those who preferred to stay out of 
Israel , but they had no power over the overviielming majority of refugees 
vJio -want to go back®. The position of Arab States remains unaltered. 
The question of Arab States abi l i ty to absorbe them or the vast 
land recources of Arabs comj^red to the Israels is not entirely irrelevent, 
but also completely i l log ica l . The suggestion that since Arabs have larger 
land as compared to the Israel i , they should rehabilitate the Arab 
refugees amongst themselves, is l ike asking a man who has been forcibly 
throw out of his house, that since his brother has a much bigger house 
than the one the robber has occupied, he has no right to claim his own 
house back* 
The treatment Israel offers to over a quarter of a million of 
Christian and Muslim Arabs marooned in Israel is a shocking ejffimple of 
the worst type of religious and racial discrimination prescl^iced anywhere 
in the world, compared to this even the policy of aparthied in South 
Africa would seem linient and humane. There have been numerous state 
laws written in the Statute Book of Israel'idiich have virtually rediJced 
the position of Arab citizens as third class subjects, the f i r s t class 
being the European Jeiiis, followed by the non European Jews. Arabs are 
not allowed to move aboxit f ree ly in any part of Israel and cannot go out 
of the country. 
Beminiscent of the notorious apartheid practice in certain tovffis of 
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Soubh Africa the Arabs have to carry identity cards with the le t ter 'B' 
•written on them indicating their lower status. For travel to any area out 
side their municipal l imit, Arabs are obliged to obtain a special 
permiscdon from military attfchorities. Quite often this permission has 
been refused point blank even in the case of a dying patient who had to 
be carried to a hospital outside the prescribed limits, Numerois such 
instances have been cited by even Jews writers travelling in Israel 
and have also beea reported and taken note of by varioiB organisations 
of the United Nations. 
There are thousands of Arabs considered as absenties because they 
moved from their area of residence to another in I s i » e l . Their property 
was confiscated and put at the disposal of the guardian of enemy 
property. Whenever new immigrants arrive in Israel, the Arabs are 
evacuated from their homes imder any pretence in order to accommodate the 
new immigrants. Israel also forces the Arab people to emigrate frcxm 
Israel , article lOl of the Emergency Regulations empowers the Chief of 
Staff of the Israeli Army to arrest for one year any Arab without giving 
reasons of such an act. 
There is no other country in the world where a section of i ts 
population is legal ly siggled out for a discriminatory treatment merely 
because i ts religo3a& happens to be different from the one professed by 
its rulers. In Israel, Arabs belonging both the Christian and Muslim 
faiths, have been o f f i c i a l l y subjected to various regulations of Matrial 
Law since 1948 which have rendered their status even less than ths.t of 
third class citizens. This is perhaps the Israel i osoncept of socialism 
in action. 
Arabs cannot get jobs in important Government departments such as 
the police and the Foreign service. Arabs are prevented from forming their 
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ovjn pol i t ical parties and are prohibited froaa making any contacts with the 
outside world, which the authorities may consider of " an important pol i t ical 
nature". They can neither go to meet their friends and relations across the 
norders nor are they permitted to come bac^ : to their country once they leave 
the land* The most shameful aspect of a l l such restrictions is the fact 
that they fona a part of a l l o f f i c i a l laws and regulations. 
On the qtestion of international justice and the r i ^ t s of the Arabs 
on their territory, India is irrevocably and plainly with the aggrieved 
party, that is, the Arabs,The Indian Government stgjports the Arabs'right 
over the irater of r iver Jordan which Isjyael has been attempting to divert 
to make the desert bloom. Jordan is an international river and a single 
drop of i t s v/ater cannot be taken idthoub the consent of riparian countries, 
when Israel declared that i t would not discontiniB i ts schemes of diverting 
the course of river Jordan despite Arab protests, Mr. Jawaharlal Ifehrji met 
the Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi and assured them of India's sipport on 
the issue. He liad the stroport of the whole countrj'- on this fraternal assurance 
to the Arabs. Indian nex;s-papers and intellectuals f e l t equally strongly on 
this issue. A typical example of the Indian resentment against the Israel i 
intransigence was a long le t ter by India's former Ambassador to Iran, a 
distinguished historian and President of the Indian Association for Afro-
Asian Solidatiry, Dr.Tara Ghand. His statement needs to be quoted in fiiLl 
because of i t s c lar i ty and deep understanding of the problem. 
" An alarming sitvetion has arise as a result of the announcement 
made by Israel that the water of the Jordan river would be diverted from 
their noimal course fo r use in Israel terr i tory. Evidently this devel«pttent 
may lead to far reaching consequences and requires the inmediate attention 
of the people of India. 
" The Israe l i Gorvernment plans to begin the operation early in 1964, 
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Thgraam at irrigating the Negaf desert area at the expense of the Arabs 
by diverting the xjaters of the Jordan and its tributaries which rise in 
Syria and Lebanon, and which are of v i ta l importance of the economy of 
these comtries. The result wil l be that while the greater portion of the 
waters flow through the Arab lands, the mi la tra l action of Israel wi l l 
deprive the Arabs of a considerable portion of their share, 
"The Jordan is an international r iver. The principle of international 
law lay down f i r s t l y , that no comtry shoiiLd attempt to direct a water 
coixt'se so as to caT:Be harm to other comtries, and secondly, that the 
right of a state on that part of a waterv/ay which runs inside its 
territory is not an absulute one, but is subject to the right of other 
comtries tlwugh v^iich the same water course runs,""*-
" I t is obvioias that the plan of the Israe l i Govermient to 
disturb the recent utilization of the Jordan waters in defiance of Arab 
wishes wil l ncrt only be flagi^nt violation of the decisions of the Syrian 
Israel i Mixed ".rmistice Ccsmaission forbidding Israel from proceeding on 
any activity of diverting Jordan river water in the demilitarised zone 
but also set ^ at naught international laws and conventions as embodied 
in agreements and treaties and julgemente- of International Court of 
Arbitration. This attempt to take Law into their o;,m hands, despite the 
principle recognis^ed internationally and stgjported by the U.N.threatens 
to create crisis which may affect the peace of the world. 
" I t is, therefore, incumbent on a l l those who believe in the 
principle of peaceftil solution of international disputes to prevent the 
Israel i Government from milateral action to divejrt the Jordan waters c^ nd 
thereby to cause hardhip to the Arab nation. 
^^  I t is the primary responsibility of the Iliited Nations to intervene 
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immediately so that no ugly situation fraught with dangerous consequences 
may develop. The India Association for Afro-4sian solidatiry is of the 
opinion that the thi^sat of Israel to divert the Jordan waters furnishes 
a Just cause for Arabs grievances and resentment and we appeal to the 
Govomment of Israel to desist from a course which may lead to war and 
bloodshed."1. 
Dr.Tara Chand mirrored the feelings of his Fellow Indians when he 
•yi expressed his views in such a cogent and clear manner. What is needed 
is nob a stixiy of the pict\ire portrayed by Israel 's glip propagandists 
inside and outsid© India but a real ist ic appraisal of what actually Israel 
i s . The iirabs say that i t constitijfces the greatest danger to their 
terr i tor ia l integrity, peace and prosperity. That their fears are not 
absolutely baseless or imaginary is proved by the ominous postures of 
Israel . 
India and i ts national leaders resolutely opposed the Zionist 
Philosophy as a matter of principle. Their antipath tovArds Zionlsih vjas 
reflected in the o f f i c i a l statement of the Indian National Congress and 
after independence in the attit'ude of the Government of India. I t would 
be a gross mistake to presume that this policy was formulated to ingratiate 
the Indian Muslims or to appease the Arabs. The Indian National movement 
led byMahatma (iandhi and his disciple Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru cherished 
certain principles v^iich were close to the heaorb of every conscious Indian. 
One of them was the separation of religion from nationalism. TIic 
foundations of a secular India are laid on this principle. 
This is the origin of Gandhiji's aversion to Zionism, Zionism seeks 
to inst i l a sense of separateness in t$e Jews and expects from them to be 
1. Dr.Tara Chand, Indian Express - 9 January 1964. 
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loyal only to Israel irrespective of their citizenship. The uLtimate 
destination of every Jew according to Zionist doctrine, is Israel. Mahatma 
Gandhi's rejection of Zionsim vas categoric since he reftsed to be pressuris-
ed into accepting i t as a basis of nation state, when his old associate 
from SoTibh Africa, Hermann Kallenback who was a dedicated Zionist approached 
him in 1937 to entire him in approving the Zionist doctriae, Gandhiji 
pol i te ly b\xb firmly refused to accept Kallenbach's arguments. Gandhiji 
mirrored the feel ing of India and what he said tvrenty-eight years ago on 
the sinister ef fects of Zionist doctrine s t i U holds water and i s imbibed 
in the o f f c i a l policy of the Government of India, 
But Gandhiji's were net the astray misings. He had a thorough study 
of the ramification of a transplanted society in Palestine and would not 
bxjdge an inch from his earlier stand despite unceasing ef forts by the 
apologists of Zionism including British Member of Parliament, ^5idney 
Silverman, and the American author and his personal friend, Louis Fischer. 
His replies to them were similar at what he had told to Kallenback. On the 
eve of Bilestine tragedy he was more convinced of the grevious wrong done 
to the Arabs and wrote a long article in August 1947 in Harijan expressing 
his moral si^jport to the helpless Idlestindans who were being iprooted 
from their homes and f i e lds , 
v/as 
Gandhiji/hurt when he was told that the Zionist lobby has given 
a new twist to his convictions against the Zionist antics. The international 
Zionist magnates especially in Britain and the ISiited States came out with 
a startling classfication of Ms pronouncements. They said that Qindhiji 
was opposing the Zionist moves because he •wanted to please Indian Muslims 
some of whom are his close associates. He did not le t the l i e spread and cam 
cams oiii with a stronger statement. "I have said often", he wrote, «*that 
I would not se l l truth for the saloe of India's de l ive i^ce . Much less I 
would do so for winning Muslim friendship"1. Bii; the Zionist lobby was 
1. Jainsen, G.H, - The Statesman, New Delhi - 5 April 1966. 
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not silenced and even now i ts functionries hold to the same erroneoi® 
views. This has harmed the Zionists themselves. 
But Gandhiji was not alone in his condemnation of Zionist, As 
has been mentioned earlier, the Indian National Congress held similar 
views and expressed them publicly whenever the issue came 155. One of the 
main reasons of muttial understanding between the Indian leaders and the 
Arab nationalists was their common aversion to the religion being T:ised 
as a means to achieve pol it ical ends. The Egyptian pol it ical leader, 
Mr.Saad ZaghluL and Cfendhiji had inte l lectml ly come very close to each 
other because of their secular approach to national pol it ics. I t was 
beca\3se of their secular oublook, that Indian National leaders never 
reconciled to the transplantation of a Zionist enclave in Rxlestine, The 
National Congress i^ich is now a ruling party adheres to i ts earlier 
declarations since i t has inherited the glorious past, of a secular 
aufclook and humanistic anti-imperialist and anti-colonial approach. The 
plea that the Jews have no state and are therefore, entitled to a home-
land does not f a i l to carry conviction ^d.th the leaders who control the 
Government, The argument of a historical real ity or a pol i t ical fate-
accompli also does not appeal to the Indian Government as i t would amount 
to the acceptance of a very dangeroiis principle and open a floodgate 
of justifications for a l l the imperialist-cxiiar-c&lonial powers to maintain®^ 
their hegemoney over theficonomically bsctajard, politicaliyunstable and 
mil i tar i ly weak nations. The argument that the Jews have conqmred i t , 
and 
colonised,/4rli developed i t and are therefore the rightful owaers of the 
J&lestinian lands is also wide of the mark. The right of a people to own 
their lands is imprescriptible and no coip detat or International power 
polit ics can snatch ai;ay this right. I f the western powers had a soft 
comer for the persecuted Jews they should have offered some chunks from 
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their own terr i tor ies and helped them in establishing their states there. 
The demonstration of their philanthropic and al truist ic attitudes by-
rehabilitating them on other peoples e i i l has never appealed to Indian 
leadership. I t sets a very dangerous precedent and i f allovjed to go 
uncha^enged, i t may have very dire consequences and might i^jset a l l 
the po l i t ica l arrangements based on the principles of international law, 
or decent international behaviour. The Indian leadership, by and large , 
has therefore ncrt reconciled i tse l f with the establishment of Israel 
and consequently the Indian Government has norfc recognised the state of 
Israel so f a r . 
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CHfl.PTER IV. 
THE NATIONALIZ I^TION OF THE SUEZ CANAL AJJOLO-FRENCH - I S M L I 
AGGRESSION - THE IIDDlAN REACTION. 
The issuQ of Suez Canal was engaging the attention of Naseer f o r 
quite a long time. He thought that i t was eco!ioniical].y det^rimental to 
the Egyptian interests and. po l i t i ca l l y untenable to allow the erstvrhile 
owners to allow to continue to manage the af fa irs of the Stiez Canal, On 
July 26,1956 he nationalized the Suez Canal Company. He announced that 
he would compensate the shareholders fu l ly , paying them at the rate of 
the last closing prices of the previous day on the Paris Bourse, and 
that he would use the 100,000,000 dollars annual revenue from the canal 
to build the Dam, The shareholders were, however, not very sure that he 
•would keep his word. I t caused a st i r , in the pol i t ica l circles of the 
West and the comtries which were in an advantageoxjs position in the 
previous arrangement f e l t concerned. I t would not be possible, for lack 
of space, to recapotulate the hist>orical background and i ts po l i t i ca l 
conseqijences, •^•-few coraraents, however, would be necessary to maintain 
continuity in narration. 
National feelings against Suez Canal company had been mounting 
in Egypt f o r many years before 1956, In order to blunt the edge of the 
sharp criticism going for years, royalties paid to Egypt had recently 
been increased, and the number of Egyptian Directors on the board 
increased from 4 out of 32 to 12 otri; of 40, In addition an undertaking 
had been given to employ more Egyptians, specially in higher posts. This 
concession was due to expire in I9b8, 
IMder the Convention of 1888 governing the use of the canal, i t 
was provided that i t must be open to a l l vessels in peace and wa^, except 
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of those nations with which Egypt herself is at war at any time, Tho-ugh 
the British Government challenged the legal ity of this step as i t was 
could 
international ccmpany, i t was doubtful whether much svpport/have been 
obtained for this view. I t also contended that nationalization had altered 
the circurastances existing when the Convention had been signed, which were 
implicitly part of the Convention, so that in e f fect i t had been null i f ied*. 
For some months i t was in the air that the British contemplated a military-
action, B-ub, long before the military measures were actually precipitated 
by Israel 's attack on Sgypt, this design, i f there was any, seems to 
have been put aside. Kfforts were being made to settle the issue through 
diplomatic channels, mainly by the 5uoz Canal Users Association formed for 
this purpose. Britain v/as demanding some foim of international control and 
operation of the canal. This proposal was of course unacceptable to Nasser. 
The British could not obtain support from more than a handful of comtries. 
The United States, in particular, was unwilling to support British 
insistance. Dulles v;as always prepared " to sxgjport Britain in negotiations 
based on the proposal, but was ready to concede groimd to achieve a compro-
mise settlement "1. The British Government, ho\jever, did ncrt; subscribe to 
this view. I f the matter v/ere l e f t to diplomacy, a settlement would have 
been reached on the lines of the Indian proposal— Egyptian/with an 
international Council available to hear appeals or ccanplains from Users 
nations. 
India was mainly interested for three reasons. Firstly, Indian 
GoveiTHaeni was very friendly to Egypt and v/anted to extend a l l sr^jport. 
1, Crowley D.w. - The background to current Af fa i rs . 
P. 325. 
London, Macmillan, 1958, 
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moral and pol it ical to vindicate ilgyptian stand, iiecondly, India was 
always sympathetic to nations who were trying to stand on their own legs 
and vit iat ing a l l imperialists designs to keep some vestage of power* 
Thirdly, India being one of the chief user nations had intimate econcmic 
and commercial involvements in the proper functioning of the Suez Canal. 
In November 1956, however, came Israel 's attack and the Anglo-
French intervention followed immediately, Israel had naturally been 
growing increasingly nervous as communist sipplies of arms were delivered 
to the jUrab countries^ bub she probably chose this moment to attack —~ 
even i f we concede that tliei^ was no^ any collusion — in the knowledge 
that Egypt vras not an good texms v;ith France and Britdlh — two of the 
signatories of the Tripartite Declaration, which in nonaal circmstances 
bound them to take action against any act of aggression. The intervention 
was forceful ly launched but the British Government was greatly surprised 
at the way the American Govomment reacted. I t ijas also believed that 
they had infact concealed their ev i l intentions froca the Government. 
Though the Arabs believe otherwise, i t was apparently Uhited States 
presstire, backed by indications, that appeals for aid over the dollar 
crisis that would obviously follow would not be sympathetically received 
unless there \^ ere rapid compliance, and not the Rvissian threat of action, 
that forced Britain and France to withdrav;. In addition to the strongly 
* 
anti-imperialist sentiment of the American people and the intervention, 
an attempt to impose ones w i l l by force on a weaker power, had a l l the 
attributes of a tottering imperialism. The United States Government was 
probably motivated by fear of losing the goo-dwill of the uncommitted 
Afro-Asian groi^ of nations i f i t remained a silent and passive spectator. 
I t may well have taken the view that to lose the friendly regard of this 
large grovp of comtries r^as a fewer prospect to the Tfest than the 
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endangering of the Stjsz passage. In other words, Britain and France had 
dealt a serious blow to a v i ta l American Interests. 
Since Russia had achieved close relations with the Arab countries, 
i t was a genuine fear at times clearly expressed that revival of war-fare 
between the Arabs and the Jews would ci^ate real danger of a major war 
between the Conmiunist world and the west. Bxib on a closer analysis this 
seemed most unlikely. Though there was, and even at present is always a 
possibility of a prolonged and intensified tension or sporadic worsening 
of relations, neither of these two super powers would engage in a major, 
nuclear war for the sake of the Arabs. 1. The Russtons only go to the 
extent of creating embarrassing situations for the U.a.A. in the Ifest 
Asian Region so as to rule out the possibility of the Americans obtaining 
any concessions, bases or a polit ical foothold there. 
Inaugrating the Indi-Arab Society at Bombay in October 1954, 
Mr.Nehru said that India's relations with the west Asian region v;ere 
infact more ancient than her ties with other ja rts of Asia. These 
relictions ere largely of cultural, commercial and religious character. 
Caramon European domination had snapped these relations and t ies of 
friendship, and therefore, he urged that India should renexj these 
ancient relations and old bonds, of ffeiendship. 
Mr.Nehru visited Cairo several times, and had been to Damascus 
and Beirut and toxu^d Saudi Arabia during the period 1954- 66. The Shah 
of Iran and the King of Satdi-Arabia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt 
the Prime Minister of the Stdan -v/ere among the statesman of these 
countries who visited India during this period. This is indicative of 
1. I t has been more than proved during the recent Arab Islyael 
conflict (Jifcie 1967). 
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the keen interest India has been taking in this region. 
The reaction of the Government and people of India to the iigyptian 
act of nationalization i^ ias just the opposite of that of the western 
Governments and press except that many in India, inclining the 
Government had some reservations in respect of the timing and manner of 
nationalization in that a perfectly legitimate and dont-estic act had been 
to appear, or did appear, as an act of retaliation against the Iv'esfs 
reftisal to aid the construction of Aswan Dam, 
i^ndit Wehrji speaking on the subject in the Indian Parliament 
characterised the attack as "International gangsterism" - rather a harsh 
and undiplomatic expression but i t goes to ref lect the intensity of anger 
Tiiich Mr»Nehru f e l t on this unwarranted act of naked agression thinly 
disuised as 'intervention*. Indian opinion suspected that the extra-vagant 
reaction of Britian and Fiance to the Egyptian act of nationalisation was 
largely due to a fear that iCgyptian control of the canal might directly 
af fect their own rights of free-navigation and indirectly their o i l interests 
in the west Asian region, 
India and Indians has deepest sympathy for, and support to, Egyptian 
aspirations, internal and external, and indeed, they had almost identical 
attit ides on most of the world issues following a non-alignment policy, 
of adhering to the Panchshell and the Bandung principles. Therefore, Indians 
not merely supported the Egyptian action, but appreciated its large 
significance which , as always, late Prijne-Minister Nehru voiced promptly 
and authentically. The nationalization of Suez Canal, said he on l Augrwt 
at a public meeting, was "symptomatic" of the weaking of the domination by 
the European Powers over west Asia which had lasted for over a hundred years". 
The anxiety f e l t in European countries over the question was due to European 
Oil interests in west Asia and the fact that their economies were based on o i l 
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Both because of being an important user of the canal(about of 
India's imports and of her experts passed throijgh the canal)especially 
at the time when India's economic developnent had reached a certain tempo, 
and even more bebause of the grave international situation created by 
l^estern reactions and military meastires, the Government vjas passionately 
interested in averting the confl ict. 
In a statement on 8 August 1956, to the Lok Sabha Mr.Nehru annomced 
that the Government of India had decided to take part in the London 
Conference with a "sense of great responsibHity", after receiving 
assurances from the British Government that India's participation would 
not imply her commitment to the principles set out in the Anglo-French 
American statement. The Indian Government were i s o satisfied that their 
participation would not injure the interests of the sovereign rights and 
dignity of Egypt. 
In the course of his statement Mr.Nehru defended Egypt action of 
nationalizing the ausz Canal, and sharply criticised the western Po^ .xcrc 
for the Military and naval measures taken. The nationalisation of Suez 
Canal, he said," had been precipitated by the decision not to assist in 
the contruction of Aswan Dam, and there had arisen a grave crisis which, 
i f nc3ft resolved peacefully, can lead to a conflict the extent and effects 
of which i t is not eaSy to assess^l. 
Mr.Nehru went on to say that British French Military and Naval 
movements had aggravated the situation, casued deep resentment in the jlrab 
coimtries and tiiroughout 4sia generally, and aro j^sed "Gononial memories". 
The London conference on Suez Canal ended on 23 August 1956, after 
having lasted for seven days. Two plans for the future of the canal were 
pub fonjard during the conference. 
! • Kessing's Contemporary Archieves December, 1956, 
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1. A U-S.plan, presented by Dr.Dulles and latber amended by 
Rikistan, Zthopia, P3rsia and Turkey, for international control of the 
canal, 
2. An Indian plan presented by Mr.Krlshna Menon, for the operation 
of the canal by Egypt, assisted by an international advisory body 
representing user of the canal. This plan was si^ Dported by Soviet <Iiaion, 
Indonesia, Ceylon and India herself. 
Defending Egypt's right to nationalize the Suez Canal company, 
Mr.Krishna Memon maintained that the latter was " a concessionsire from 
the Egyptian Government" and that i ts status, " legal factual and 
otherwise" vMs " derived from the concession granted by Egypt in the 
exercise of her Sovereign rights". "^ Tt is necessary to bear in mind", 
he continTised, "the the Suez Canal Company cannot be identified with 
»the Suez Canal"1. 
Again, in a statement on September 13,1956, to the Lok Sabha, 
Mr.Nehru expressed his "surprise and regret at Sir Anthony Eden's 
speech and said that the establisittnent of a Canal user's Association vias 
f u l l of dangerous potentialities and for reaching consequences"2. 
"I have communicated to the Erirae Minister of U.K. and the 
ftesident of U.S.A., our view that the situation that emerged after 
the Menzies mission, and the statement made by the Egyptian Government 
accepting a l l international obligations and inviting negotiations, has 
1. For f u l l discussion see ilden Anthony: The Memoirs of Antony Eden. 
"Full c i rc le" 1950. 
2. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves. October 1956. 
3. Ibid. 
opened the way to a s e t t f ^ n t 
"The Government of Indi^. also regret to learn that pilots of British, 
French, Italian and other nationalties are being withdrav/n. This action 
is not calculated to promote the -use of Canal and is not in the interests 
of \jser-nations,''3. 
The following o f f i c i a l statement was issued in New Delhi on 31 Oct, 
1956:-
The Government of India have learned with profound concern of the 
Israel aggression on Egyptian territory, and the siibsequent ultimatum 
delivered by the U.K. and France to the Egyptian Government, t^ich was to 
be folloT,;ed by an Anglo-French invasion of Egyptian territorj ' . They consider 
this a flagrant violation of the U.N.Charter and opposed to a l l the 
principles laid down by the Bandung Conference. This aggression is bound 
to have far-reaching consequences in Asia and Africa, and may even lead to 
war on an extended scale. The Government of India are convoying their vic\^s 
to the Governments concerned, and earnestly trust that, even at this late 
hour, this aggression wil l be halted and foreign troops xd-thdraxvH from 
Jilgyptian terr i tory. They hope that the world coimrjuiity as represented in 
the U.N. wi l l take e f fect ive action to this end"l. 
In addition, the following message was sent by the (Late) Prime 
Minister, Mr.Nehru, to the U.N,secretarj'-~General, 
"Iffe have been profoundly shocked by the recent development in the 
Middle East and, more particularly, by the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt 
after their rejection of the Security Council resolirtion mo\''ed by the Ihited 
atates. I t is clear that Israel has committed large-scale aggression against 
Egypt. Instead of trj-ing to stop this aggression, the U.K.and France are 
3, Ibid. 
1. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves, December 1956, 
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theiaselves invading Egyptian territory. This is not only an affront to the 
Security Comcil and the violation of the U.N.CSiarter, bub also l i t e l y to 
lead to the gravest possible conseqtiences a l l over the world. Egypst which 
has suffered from Isiraeli aggression, has in addition to suffer grievously 
by the Anglo-French invasion of her territory. The argument that this 
invasion is meant to protect the canal to ensure free t r a f f i c has no force, 
as the f i r s t result of this invasion is for this t r a f f i c to cease. In view 
of the disastrous consequences of the invasion of the Egyptian territory, 
I earnestly trust the U.H.will take strong steps in this matter, he prevent 
the world plunging into war, and demand the immediate withdrawl of a l l 
foreign troops from Egypt. The procedures of the U.Nja'i:et be swifter than 
those of invasion and aggression. In sending you this message I am not 
reflecting the unanimous views of my Government and people bub also, I 
am sure, of a large number of other people"1. 
'On 21 October an Egyptian nevjspaper 'Al-Gamhoria«^ published an 
Indian Plan for Suez compromise developed apprently through Menon's 
e f forts with Nasser"2. 
In a speech at Hyderabad on the same day( 1 November 1956) 
Mr.Nehru described the Anglo-French action in Egypt as "Naked aggression" 
which would not be tolerated by '^he self-respecting and independent 
nations of Asia and Afr ica» . After declaring that India's sympathies were 
entirely with Egypt, he -went on:" There has been the sudden invasion of 
Egypt by Israel in breach of an armistice and of the U.N.Charter. In these 
disputes our sympathies have been for the Arabs nations. They have had a 
raw deal and this must be remedied. Bub vre have no enmity towards Israel , 
1, Kessing's Contemporary -.rchieves, December 1956. 
Zm Finer Herman: Dulles over Suez (The Theory and Practice of his 
diplomacy) I^ge 339. 
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Every member of the U.U.shoTiLd try to stop i t and resist i t . Eitb Britian 
and France issued an uLtimation to Egypt,. "The Suez Banal 
was functioningproperly. I f there was any danger to the Canal i t was from 
Israel, viiich advanced 90 miles inside ligypt. Britain has been a force 
piece in the past tvo years, and because of this my sorrow and distress 
is a l l the greater for the amazing adventtsre Tiiich Britain and France have 
entered into^l. 
During a day of intensive polit ical activity in New Delhi Mr.Hehru 
had two meetings with the U.K.High Commissioner and also saw the U.S., 
Soviet and Kgyptian Ambassadors. A message expressing Indians fu l l stpporfc 
for iigypt was sent by Mb.Nehru to President Nasser on 31 October 1966, 
India thijs played a remarkable role in s\5)porting Arab casus and in 
bringing the two parties to a negotiation table. I t went a long way in 
strenghtending the position of Egypt vis-a-vis the Western powers and also 
the world at large. Since then India's attitxxie has been consistently pro-
Egypt on the Suez Canal issue and also with regard to i ts stand against 
Israe l i aggression and encroachment on the Arab c3cil. 
1. Ifessing's Contemporary Archieves, December 1956, 
CHAPTER ~ Y. 
THE THIRD CONFLICT - DEBi=ER THRUST OF THE ISRAELI DAGGER 
President Naseer said at a Press Conference on 28 May 1967, tliat 
In the even of a straight war with Israel "nothing wil l happen to the 
Suez Canal" but i f others intervened " there wil l be no Suez Canal". He 
also emphasised that Egypt wotiLd in no circumstances allow Israel i shipp-
ing to sai l through the Starits of Tiran, The Egyptian President also 
affirmed that '^ fchis was a stand from which I shall not btdge an inch". 
In Tel-Avivc, Mr.EShakol said in a broadcast th£it Israel wished 
to resolve the dispute with Egypt by displomatic means. At the same time 
he reiterated that the closure of the Strait of Tiran to Israe l i shipping 
constituted an act of aggression against Israel, who had the I'ight to 
self-defence and would exercise i t is necessary. President Nasser did not 
bother about such statement and the blockade of the Quid of Agaba v/as 
instituted by hijn in May 1967, 
"The Government of India has talccn the position as far hack as 
1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba is an inland sea and that entry to the Gulf 
Strait of Tiran l i es within the terr i tor ia l inters of the U.A.R, and 
Saudi Arabia, t-fe adhere to the view. I t is our view that no state or a 
group of states should attempt challenge by force the sovereignty of the 
U,A,R, over the Strait of Tiran", said Mr.Chagla, India's ex-Foreign 
Minister, in Indian Parliament on 25 May 1967, 
This statement byMr-Chagla correctly suras vqp the situation about 
the Gulf of Aqaba. Since the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba is within the 
terr i tor ia l waters of the TJ.A,R, and a state of war exists betxjeen the 
U,A,R, and Israel, the international law gives U,A.R. right to prevent 
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I s rae l i ships from passage in the Strait of Tiran. 
The supporters of Israel are trying to confuse the world opinion by-
quoting wrongly from the Territorial Sea agreement(1958) to prove that 
Israe l i ships have a right "innocent transit of Tiran Strait", under para 4 
of the article 16 of the Agreement. But this article of the Inteniational 
Territorial Sea Agreement is not applicable in this case. The provisions of 
the agreement are valid only in time of peace, whereas a statement war is 
s t i l l in existance between Arab states and Israel* 
I t should be remembered that i t is not the f i r s t time that the TJJl.R, 
dinied to Israel ^ hipping of access to the Gulf of Aqaba, I t is nothing more 
than the return to the status-quo which existed from the time Israel usriped 
the Arab territorj*- of Palestine t?) t i l l the time of Sijez Aggression in 
1956 when Shartn^el-Sheikh area, which is facing the island of Tiran, was 
occupied byi Israe l i invaders after the withdrawl of the U.A,R, troops from 
Sinai to meet the Anglo-French military threat of Port S aid.The IN Forces 
had been withirawn from its boarders,the UAR armed forces had taken cFver 
ag ain the S hantt-sl-S iiaiich area and IB.R had again imposed restrictions on 
Israe l i shipping. 
The fact that I s f a e i l i ships were allowed passage into the Sulf 
f o r a shoffc span of time consequent upon the 1956 aggression and the prese-
nce of IW Forces, obviously enough, does not confer on i t any immutable 
right to the usage of the Arab terr i tor ia l waters. I t was centuries ago 
when force and rights were synonymous. This can no longer be maintained 
in our age, otherwise even colonialism coxLld be legal ly just i f ied. 
The Gulf of Aqaba is situated east of Sinai and boarders UAR in the 
H est, and Saudi Arabia and Jordan in the east. I t is 98 miles long. The 
broadest of the Gulf water does not exceed 12 miles. The only entrance 
to the Gulf is from the Red Sea which is 9 miles wide. At the entrance ' 
of the Gulf there are two islands - Tiran and Sanafir which are 5 miles 
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wide and are mder Arab sovcreighnty, 
•^his innocent transit does not apply to the Israel and the lAR cjan 
never permit a transit of Israe l i ships less than one mile from the coast 
nor -would i t pemit the transit of weapons or strategic materials bound to 
strengten the forces of aggression, "1, 
Following UThant's acceptance of the Egyptian demand, the IH Emergency 
Force in the West Asia was o f f i c i a l l y withdrawn from the border between the 
U/IR and Israel, on which i t had been stationed for ten years. In a report to 
the Security Council U Thant said he had complied with the UAR demand for 
e 
the withdrawn of U.N.E.F. for the foilowingrsaspns:-
1. "In practical fact, U.N.E.F. could not remain Sor function x i^thoub the 
continuing coBsent and cooperation of the host coxintry," 
2. have been influenced by my deep concern to avoid any action which 
wo\ild either compromise or endanger the contingents which make 15) the force. 
Menawhile the callipg-up of reservists by both Bgypt and Israel 
was announced on 21 May 1967. Press reports from Cairo continued to speak 
of the contin-ued eastward movement of strong Egyptian armoured forces in 
the direction of the Israel border. 
The extreme tension which had persisted in the Vfest Asia for several 
•weeks and the build-j?) large armed forces on both sides culminated in the 
early hours of 5 June 1967, in the oxit-break of war between Israel on the 
one side and the U.A.R. Syria and Jordan on the other. Responsibility for 
the outbreak of hosti l i t ies was obscure, the Israel i alleging that Egyptian 
armoured units had advanced across the frontrier into Israel, while the 
Egyptians alleged on Israel i attack across the border and an air rais on 
Cairo. 
In one of the most repid and dramatic campaigns in modem history, 
1. U.A.R. News - issued by the Bureau of the Ifiiited Arab Republic Embassy -
Special Press Release May 1967, Crisis in west Asia Series No.l, 
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Israel achieved within 80 hours a ccjmplete military victory over her Arab 
opponents before a l l host i l i t i es ceased on June 10, in response to repreated 
cease-fire calls by the U.N,Seciirity Council. After v irtual ly destroying the 
a i r forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria on the f i r s t day of the war, and 
gaining complete control of the air on a l l grounts, the aimed forces of 
Israel had by the end of s ix day's war overrun to the entire Sinai peninsula, 
includojig ShaiTO-ol-Sheik, advanced to the Sijz Canal, and captured the Gaza 
Strip. 
I t was against this background that the TJ.K.General Assembly began 
on 19 June 1967 a special emergency session on the situation in West Asia, 
at the request of the Soviet liiion* The convening of a special session of 
Jrhe General Assembly was supported by a l l the communist countries, the 
great majority of the Asian and African State, including a l l tha Arab 
countries. 
The f i r s t speaker at the Assembly's special session was Mr.Kosygin, 
the Soviet Prime Minister. He began by condemning the Uiited States for i ts 
"aggression against the Vietnames people". He continued that I s rae l i troops 
began contsentruting on the Syrian f r o n t i e r and mobilization was carried 
oiA in the country. The Soviet Premier further said that " on 5 June, Israel 
started war agaiast the ISiited Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. The 
Government of Israel flouted the charter of the United Ifetions and the 
standards of International law, and thiis showed that a l l i t s peaceful 
declarations were fa lse through and through"!. 
He fupfeher maintained that " the United JJations cannot overlook these 
crimes (and) must compel Israel to respect international law. Those 
1. Kessing's Contemporary Archieves - July 1957. Page 22153. 
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who are the maste3>-iainds behind the crimes in the occupied territories of the 
Arab comtries, and these who conmiit those crimes, must be stemtly called 
to account"!* Mr.Kosygin continued: 'Vhat is the attitude of the United btates 
and British Governments to the Israe l i claims? In actual fact they are 
encouraging the aggressor here as well By occigjying territories 
of the liiited Arab Republic, Jordan, and Sj^ia, Israel is continuing to 
challenge the Tfiiited Nations and a l l peace-loving states 
The Arab case was put by King Husain of Jordan, vAio visited New York 
to address the General Assembly in person, and also by President Atassi of 
Syria, Dr»Mahmood Fawzi, Deputy Foreign Minister of U^.R, and other .irab 
r epre s ent at ive s • 
Dr.Fawzi alleged that Israel had made i ts plans for "aggression" long 
before 5 Juae 1967, while at the time of the Israe l i attack on 5 June, U.A»R» 
Syria and Jordan had "ncft completed their defensive precautions". He said that— 
"during the period of hosti l i t ies the U.b .Sixth Fleet, bristling witlTevil^feaC^ 
and foully-smelling C.I .A.". , was "omino-usly poised" in the Vicinity of Arab 
shores, where i ts presence i.'as resented* Britain also had polluted the waters 
of the Mediterranean" behaving l iks a bull in a China shop and joining in with 
the big bull U.S.A." Dr.Fawzi rejected the American draft resolution and accused 
President Johnson of abetting Israel's'insane ventures'4» 
President Atassi described Israel as a strong-hold of "British, 
American and i'^st German imperialism" and accused Israel of having occupied 
Syrian terr i tory after the cease-fire. ST:?)port for the Arab states and criticism 
of Israel vras eixpressed by the ex-Foreign Minister of India, Mr.M.G.Ghagla, the 
ex-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr.Sharifuddin Pirzada the Spanish delegat^ 
! • Kessing's Contemporary Archieves - July 1967. I^ge 22153. 
3. Ibid. 
4, Ibid. 
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Mr»4zner» Mr.Chagla l isted four "cardinal principles" which must be adhered 
to i f an enduring peace was to be established, v i z : ( l ) No country could 
start a war, merely because i t f e l t that a threat to i ts security existed! 
(2) No aggressor could be permitted to retain the fruits of aggression, in 
this connection Mr.Chagla called for the withdrawl of Israel i forces from 
occupied Arab territories; (3) No country could acquire another's territory 
in order to bargain from a position of st3:«ngbhj(4) Rights coiiLd ncft be 
established, terr i tor ia l disputes settled, or botrndaries adjusted by armed 
confl ict . 
Mr.Pirzada said that i t was clear that Israel had f ired the f i r s t 
shot on 5 June 1967, without any justif ication The only course of 
action for the Assembly, he declared, v?as to cmderan the aggression launched 
by Israel on 5 June, and to demand the withdrawl of Israel i forces from the -
Arab teri ' itories including the Holy Places, to be position they held prior 
to host i l i t ies , 
Mr.Aznar said the aggression had clearly been committed by Israel, 
and aggued that the western world should st^ ppoirfc the Arab cause lest crfcher 
powers gain influence in the Miditerranean, Mr.George Brown, the British 
Foreign ^Secretary, addressed the Assembly on 21 June. After stressing that 
there should be no terr i tor ia l aggrandisement resulting from the vjar, and 
that the statijs of the Jerusalem should not be altered unitiaterally, he 
based the British view of a settlement of four principles: ( l ) Settlement of 
the refugee problem;(2) recognition of the right of a l l states in the area 
to exist in Freedom and peacej (3) respect for the right of f ree and innocent 
passage through international \jatenjays; (4) the ending of the artas i^ce in 
the west Asia, 
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INDIAN FIffiLIG OHNION. 
The U.A,R. request for the withdrawl of the Tiiited Nations 
Emergency Force from, Gaza and the Senal Peninsula was explained by 
several Indian publiscists and w i t e r s . Dr.S.L.Poplai, Secretary General 
Indian Coiincil of world Affairs, said in a broadcast over A l l India Radio 
on 3 June 1967 " Even i f for the sake of argument i t is assumed that a l l 
gulfs and bays surrounded by territories of more than one state canstitiAe 
international xjaters. there is no automatic right of innocent passage 
in favour of Israel v;hich had technically never ended i ts state of v^r 
with Egypt "1, 
After tracing the developiaenbs culmirBbing in the Israe l i threat'to 
ve 
strike a dec i s i s blow" at Syria, Dr.Poplai said: "In view of her commit-
ments under the 1966 treaty with Syria, the U.A.JR, Government had to 
provide some protection of the Syrian Government, had to take some action 
that might act as a detterent against a possible Israel i attack on Syria"2. 
Dr.B.S.NJ-Iurthy, Director of atudies, Indian Academy of International 
Law and Diplomacy, examined the question in depth in the course of a broad-
ca.st on 7 Jtne 1967. He said: " i t is significant to note that the U.A.R. 
has not sought to prohibit total ly the right of passage to a l l ships but 
has only prohibited Israel i ships and other ships with the principles of 
International Law." Dr.Murthy brought to bear on the problem of the Gulf 
of Agaba his expert knolwedge of International law and commented: " The Arab 
claim to sovereignty over the Gulf is based on imaemorial possession"3. 
1. India and west Asia. Edited by G.S.Bhargava. Page 42. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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Prof.Mohd.Habib of Aligarh Muslim University, vAio was the opposition 
parties' candidate for Vice-Presidentship, in another broadcast loofcod 
at the cultural and historical aspects of the W3st Asian Crisis, In a talk 
over Al l India Radio on 14 Jme 1967, Prof.Habib said: " The state of 
Israel is not a product of Jewish culture bub one of the most cruel types 
of European Jewish colonialism that the world has seen. I t is based on the 
Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, which stated that England would 
extablish in I^lestine a national home for the Jewish people. The object 
was to win over world jewry to the side of England during the First World 
war«l. 
Prof.Habib went on to say: of the elder generation remember how, 
week after week, month after month, from 1918 to 1948 the Arabs were 
driven oub of their homes. Mahatmaji(Gandhlji) had voiced the feelings of 
a l l Indians and the substance of a l l congress resolutions "2. 
In conclusion, Prof.Habib observed: " It is heartening to see that 
during the past few weeks, despite pressures to the country, India has 
stood by the a-abs on the question of uIISF's vrithdrawl, irab rights in 
the Strait of Tiran and the pulling back of forces to the positions 
occupied by the combatants of 5 June 1967. India's policy legitimate 
rights and justice of the issues involved and the desirability of finding 
a durable peace in u'fest Asia, 4n important element of India's national 
interest"3. 
1. India and iiSest Asia. Edited by G.S.Bhargava, I^ge 47. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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Based as i t is on considerations of J-ustice, the Indian position 
on Arab-Israeli dispiite has always been of the warmest sympath to the 
Arab catee. After the establishment of Israel, India has consistently-
refused to have diplomatic relations lath i t . On specific qtujstions, 
spedially concerning Arab refugees, Indian leaders have often declared 
their ful lest sipport to the victims of Zionist colonisation. This was 
recently reiterated when Mrs.Indra Gandhi, along with Erosident Tito and 
President Naseer reaffirmed India's sij^jport to the just demand of Palestine 
refugees. As regards India-Bak dispute, the position of the Arab States, 
col lect ively taken, is clear and unequivocal. They have often declared 
that they do not want to pronounce any opinion on the merits of the 
dispute, since in their opinion that wotid impede the possibility of their 
settlement between the parties. Obviously, this stand has been well 
appreciated by the Indian Government which i tse l f has often been declaring 
that the dispute shotild be settled bilaterally between India and Pakistan 
without outside interference. India's attitude towards this problem cannot 
be governed merely by the example of some other countries, who have either 
been pressurised by the interested big powers, or have not had a proper 
comprehension of the problem or whose stakes in the Arab world are not as 
high as are ours. India's policy of lending sipport to the jrabs stems frcan 
many ajnportant factors. 
No wounder India is lending i ts f u l l siqjport to the cause of the 
Palestinian Arabs i^oare engaged in a grim battle against the Israel i 
colonalists, implanted on their land through the force of naked arms from 
Europe and America. Mrs.Indra Gandhi has admirably siraiied ip the Indian 
position in this when she told a special corespondent of the Cairo Daily 
« Al-Ahram » « that we oppose Israel not only becavse of otjr friendship 
with the Arabs, Bub also because we are opposed to the creation of States 
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on religlo-us bases neither can w recognize terr i tor ia l gains made throvigh 
aggressions"1« 
I t is th-us clear that both in i ts basic philosophy and in the 
execution of her internal and external policies, Israel stands directly-
opposed to India's policies and interests. In such a direct conflict the 
question of remaining non-aligned does nob arise at a l l , bince India is 
regarded as a great champion of truth, her continu i^sed indictment of Israel 
for her sins against peace and humanity would go a long \j!iy in strenghanf 
ing the forces of justices, vrhich alone can ensure peace in the Middle 
East. This way India x/ould not only protect her own national interests, 
bub would also render a great service to the cause of \,rorld peace. 
In fact, India's foreing policy towards the west Asia has been 
subject of bitter and f iery criticism. Both foreign and Indian critiQs 
have contended that India being a non-aliged nation should not have gone 
alloiifc to support the Arabs. The case should have been judged on merits. 
Israel, according to them as free soverigia State lias a right to exist 
and l i ve according to i ts ovm ideology. I t has a right to demand gmrantee 
ag.inst foreign attack and of indeterred navigation in international 
waterway l ike the tiUBz and Aqaba, The Arabs would do well to reconcile 
with the f a i t accompli, " Their arch enemy, the State of Israel, has come 
to stay and no internationally pertnissibie method can undo i t . The idea 
of annihilating a polit ical entity v;hich has struck its pol i t ical roots 
so deeply in the Arab soil is not only impracticable bub also i l l concieved. 
The only way out of this stalemate is to come to a just, honorable and 
permanent settlment with Israel and to end this perpetual and purposeless 
state of hosti l i ty "a. 
1. 10 July I9bb, 
2« Nasir Al i .S, — Arab Nationalism—Retrospect and Prospects, Indian 
Journal of Pol i t ical iicience, No,I Vol.I June I9t37 I^ge 51, 
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This view, howe^r, practical i t might be, does not carry-
conviction with the Arabs, l^ hat is jioDt and honottrable settlement from 
their point of view is repugnant to Israel i dream of a greater Israel* 
Moreover v;hat wi l l happen to the Palestinian Arab reftigees v/ho have a 
greater claim on their own land than the de facto visurpation of Jews, 
iVofessor Dr.Haqqi strikes at the root of the problem when he says that 
" i t is most uncharitable to accuse the Governmont of India of having 
abjizred the path of dignity and impartiality, of decency and of pragmatic 
idealisra when i t condemned in strong and unequivocal terms the Israe l i 
aggression against her neighbours. The crit ics would do well to ponder 
and search their hearts for an answer to the following questions: should 
the principle of preemptive strikes accepted and endorsed? Should an 
aggressor be permitted to retain the fruits of his aggression? Should u-e 
remain silent spectators when peace is threatened, aggression ccfraraitted 
or freedom imperilled? 
Our basic interest in the region are the preservation of pefe>ce and 
stabil ity so that our trade Itok with the west and with the region i tse l f 
may remain intact, the grovjth of progi^ssive forces in the region which 
are friendly to us and with which we can cooperate and the avoidence to 
any situation which may lead to a great power confrontation in the region. 
Our policy has to be based on these interests. 
So far as the solution of the problem is concerned, i t may not be 
easy to arrive at such a settlement in the near future. Infact. there 
seems to be some risk of a revival of hosti l i t ies, as the two arimies are 
standing face to face. However, x^orld opinion, i f i t takes a firm stand on 
the basic principle of complete withdrawl followed by negotiations, might 
have some e f f e c t . 
1, Haqqi S,A,H, India, Israel and the Ifest Asian Crisis, Main stream, 
July 29,1967, Page 12, 
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Israel must also be av^ are that i t cannot exist peacefiiLly in a hostile 
^rtib world which vastly oxdinmbers i ts own population by relying mainly 
on i ts military victory. I ts interest l ies in coming to settlement \^ich 
respects the honour,dignity and essential requirements of both the sides. 
The Arabs, like a l l peace-loving people a l l over the world, have 
hailed the Tashkent Declaration as a v/orthy example of bringing peace 
betv^een the two neighbours. Bub, i t should be realised that this peace 
became possible only because both the countries accepted each other's 
bona-fide and were universally accepted as sovereign, independent nations. 
In the case of i^ rabs and Israel, the situation is entirely dif ferent. Her 
very existance symbolises a constant aggression against the Arab people 
specially of the Bilestinlan Arabs. I t is at best as foreign enclave whose 
justifications rest t:5)on the n^ssive arms aid given to her by .-jester Powers 
and their equally vast economi-c aid. 
Moreover, Israel reftised to comply even nominally with the minimum 
of demands of peaceful international beliaviour, as embodied in the several 
rcsoliitions of the ISiited Nations. A simple test of Israel 's sincerity 
would be to ask whether she is vdlling to pay even a nominal l i p service to 
the U.W.re3olution. To complete her criminal record, Israel is never tired 
of embarking upon ever-fresh ventures of aggression against her neighbour 
defying openly the august authority of the Ihited Nations. I t is also to 
be noted that throughout the years whenever Israel starts talking about 
peace, i t soon becomes obvioiEs that she is prsparijig for an aggressive war. 
Those who have been responding to Israel 's repeated proclaraations of v;i l l inf 
ness to talk of peace with the .labs f a i l s to rel ize that peace, in order to 
be real, has to be based on justice and equity. The Israel i behaviour 
constitutes a gross defiance not only of dictates of justice, but also of 
requirements as a bona-fide member of International ccsnmunity. 
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I t is true that Palestine is not the only country which has been 
partitioned* There are many countries like Korea, Germany and Vietnam 
vrhere the division has proved distressing and painful. The partition of 
the Indian sub-continent, too, is a pertinent example. Bub, there is a 
basic difference bet-ween the division of other countries and the socalled 
partition of J^lestine. In the f i r s t place, i t is vfl-ong to use the 
word 'partition' in relation to Balestine. In Palestine i t has not been 
a case of partition. I t is that of userpation. The teerpers were not 
the people who belonged to the area. In the case of partition of other 
countries, two facts are common to a l l . Firstly, on both sides of 
partitioned state, l ived inhabitants originally belonging to the area, 
lo that extent, the tragedly was somewhat disminiched, since no foreign 
userpers had come and settled there in the place of the original 
inhabitants. Secondly, as the case with the Indian Sub-continent, the 
partition, however^ painful i t might have seemed to some people, -was 
volTjntarily agreed ipon by leaders of the sub-continent. Both have given 
unstinted recognition to each others existence as independent,sovereign 
and lawful states. In the case of idlestine, the sit\ri,ion was entirely 
di f ferent. The original iniiabitants in Idlestine were forcibly throv/n 
out, and their hearths and homes misappropriated, 
"Israel owes i ts incipient rapid growth and prosperitj'- to what 
Toynbee has called "robbery", the forbible eviction and expulsion of 
900,000 Arabs from their f ie lds, orchards, vineyears, homes, shops,facto-
ries and businesses and confiscating their property worth according to 
U,N,estimates, 560 million dollars(old ra te ) . " l » I t is generally accepted 
that humiliation at one stage and defeat at a certain stage do not draw 
1, Haqqi S.A.H, India, Israel and Ifest Asian Crisis, Page 13, 
Mainstream, July 1967, 
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the curtain on history, Poland was wiped o\ib four times. Yet today Poland 
exists. Boundaries change, justice does not. And therefore, " we stand with 
the Arabs becatise justic is on their side, we stand with them because they 
are fighting against bigger powers seeking to •undermine their independence". 
I t is, therefore, in our interest to side with the progressive 
forces of the r^ab world and not to confuse the issues on a communal 
approach. There is Christian President in Lebanon. A persons' religion does 
not matter. What does matter is that we side with progi^sssive forces and 
we side with a person l ike President Nasser of U,A.R. who, according to 
Mr. Jawahariai Nehru, helped us for more than any powers did at the time of 
the Colombo proposals. The Indian attitude is more thoroiighly reflected 
in the observation made by Mr R.K.Nehru, former Secretary General of the 
Ministry of External Af fa irs . He said," No Afro-Asian can ignore the fact 
that the State of Israel is essnetially a foreign creation. The European 
Jews, with whose sufferings India Jjas every symp i^thy were imposed on the 
homeland of an i^ sian people. They drove out the people of the soi l and 
formed a state which is based on the principle of a master race professing 
a certain religion. They have also consistently opposed a solution of the 
Arab-Israel problem on the basis of the resolutions of the TSiited Nations. 
"India has not established diplomatic relations with the new State. I t is 
not necessary for coijntry to establish diplomatic relations with every 
other country. Apart from that, Indian generally f ee l that approval should 
not be shown of the way in which Israel was created and is functioning. 
Unlike the other Afro-Asian countries which have liberated themselves from 
foreign rule, Israel is the result of an act of imposition from oufcsMe. The 
creation of this new state is not in l ine with the general trend of the 
Afro Asian resurgence". 
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Professor Dr.Haqqi fxorther mintains that the "Indra Govermerrb's 
stand on the -f-Arab-Israeli conflict has thus beeai consistent with India's 
anti-imperialist past, and in line with what Nehru and Gandhi had alx^ays 
maintained, namely, " Palestine is an Arab Gomtry and Arab interests 
should prevail there 
In the preceding chapters I have tried to bring out as clearly as I 
could, keeping in vie\/ the limitations of space and time, the Kilestine 
Problem and the attitude of India towards i t . India has been very keenly 
interested in the Problem of i^lestine, the running soar in the Arab world, 
which has taken f u l l advan'feage of the imperialist and colonial powers 
of the West, After the half-hearted application of the Wilsonion foimula 
of self determination and the formation of the mandates, appropriately 
called by Schuman "imperialism djti transition" seems to have been a constant 
e f fo r t on the part of these powers to some-how manipulate, the thrust of 
the Israel i dagger in the heart of the Arab world and to leave i t to bleed 
fo r a l l time to come. The Indian leaders before independence and the 
Indian Government after i t have most sincerely stood by their Arabs 
friends not only as a matter of diplomacy or a policy of enlightened self 
interest bii as a matter of pr inc ip le————the principle of Justice, 
equity and good conscience. The sprit iel humanism of Gandhi and the sotmd 
and bold pragmatism of Nehru laid i ts foundation. 
The friendship between India and the Arab countries has a special 
significance. I t is not l ike the common run of international reltitions 
confined to the diplcmiatic or protocol leve l . I t is a friendship based on 
close identity of national and international policies and world outlook, 
and has consistently sei-ved the cause of peace, freedom and peacefiiL co-
existence and cooperation between nations, 4 f ter independence, both 
countries have been striving to consolidate their hard won freedom and 
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develop themselves economically vdthout interference from outside. 
I t has become a truism to say that the U.A,R, and India are two 
of the main pil lars of the non-aligned world, aften described as the 
peace areas. Striving restlessly to expand the area of cooperation between 
them, the and Indiaa have always stood together in the face of 
nmerous international crises. The leaders of the U.A.fl. and India have 
al-ways held each other in high estdem; between the two peoples, \Aio are 
the inheritors of two of the most ancient civil izations in the world, has 
grown a deep understanding of the mttbrnl points of view and values. In 
4rhis f i r s t broadcast to nation as leader of the Indian Interim Goveiment 
before independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, expressed his desire for the closest 
possible relationship between independent India and the Arab nations. Egypt 
was one of the comtries with which free India f i r s t established diplomatic 
relations: Sardar KJ4.Panikar was the f i r s t Indian -Embassador in Cairo, 
In the f i e ld of trade, the relations between the two coyntries have 
been as flotirishing as the pol i t ical friendship, India's exports to the 
U,A,K. have been more than doubled in value i . e . from Rs.13.37 crores in 
1960-61 to jEis.27 crores in l965-f56. There was soane increase in imports also, 
they rose in valie from Rs.l6-42 crores to Rs.19,99 crores during the same 
period. 
The result was a remarlobly favourable turn for India in the balance 
of trade position. In 1960-61, the value of the imports from the UJl.il. 
exceeded that of export to that country by about Rs.3,crores. In 1965-66 
tl'ie balance of trede was in India's fcniiour to the tune of about Rs.7 crores, 
Itegion^wise, India's most important trade partner in Africa is the 
B 
India is an important buyer of Khyptian cotton while Jilgypt is one of the t\K3 
principal African buyers of Indian Jiie and tea. 
Apart from the material trade relations and the fact that India's l i f e 
line of international trade runs through the Arab world, there have been age 
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old cxjlttiral and spitirual relations between the Indians and the Arabs, i 
I t is , therefore, mot surprising that India's bonds of unity with the Arabs 
have stood the teat of time and have grown stronger and stronger with the 
lapse of time. Do;xbts have been e3<pressed in the pol i t ical circles of 
India over the wisdom of aliging i tse l f with the Arab cause against Israel 
as a permanent art icle of pol i t ical faith, bub as Nehru once said there 
can be no non-alignment when i t is the question of aligning with good or 
bad, India's forceful advocacy of the Arab cause in International Comcils 
is ncft an -unprincipled or dogmatic alliance with a group of countries bub 
permanent adherence to a jvist cavise. 
Indian leaders, scholars, jurists, intellectuals, diplomats and 
publicists have been discussing the pros and cons of India's policy vis-a-vls 
the State of Israel bub India has nob yet devited from her cherished path 
except that there is a slant in favour of providing a gmrantee that Israel 
also has a right to exist provided i t settles its accounts with the Arabs 
refugees and stains with a clean state. As long as the Palestinean Arab 
refugees wil l remain homeless, thesre can be no recognition of the fact that 
Israel has a right to exist at a place from where i ts rightful owner have 
been ousted to suffer t i l l eternity. Mahatma Cfendhi once said: " I have a l l 
my sympathies with the Jews. But sytapathy does ncrb blind me to the require-
ments tf justice. The cry for the national home for Jews does noffc make much 
appeal to me. I^lestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England 
belongs to the English or France to the French, I t is wrong to impose the Jews 
on the Arabs nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the 
face of overwhdilming odds," 
mim 
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